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Theoretical framework for discussing mechanism of interregional tax competition in
Russia is developed. Its models, designed both for analytical study and for empirical
verification, exploit “investment curve” notion, that mean picture of immobile or
imperfectly mobile investment projects, attached to each region.  Regions choose their tax
rates, behaving like price-takers in relation to country’s capital market. When they play
only with general tax rate, one possible mechanism of divergence effect is due to inability
of some regions to cover current needs if granting tax reductions. The effect can be
absent, when regions discriminate between old and new capital, granting tax holidays.
“Development efficiency” of tax competition is due to one-way direction of the described
competition, that is tax reduction. Fiscal efficiency has the same nature as price
discrimination benefits for monopolist, while welfare efficiency may be absent, for the
same reason.
0. Introduction
We are interested in motives and mechanisms of interregional tax competition for
investments in Russia, which is widespread now and expresses itself in various regional
tax reductions, tax relieves and especially tax holidays. Main goal is to study divergence
effect (asymmetry increase) and efficiency implications of the competition, that may give
some hints for federalism policy.
For this goal we construct a specific family of appropriate variants of tax competition
model2. All versions of our main model are in Tiebout tradition, being, specifically, close
to Oates-Schwab model of regional taxes on business (see literature revue in the next
subsection).
The difference of our approach from Oates-Schwab model is, that we consider
incomplete mobility or even immobility of investment projects, described by "region's
investment curve" notion, that is regional capital demand curve. We introduce also
exogenous parameter of capital supply mobility (in contrast with Oates-Schwab constant
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 In essence, this theory is still an insufficiently organized collection of models, or model variants,
supplemented by some links, by empirical and logical reasoning, it is not coming out of a single model.
Rather, we have in mind something like hypermodel, connecting everything, but it is not easy to make it
clear.
2country's capital supply), and a parameter of “necessary" level of budget spending. This
short-term “budget constraint" hampers possibility of some regions to grant reductions or
tax relieves to obtain future capital and revenue gains.
These specific features are supposed to rely to Russian specific situation. Most real investment in
current years of stagnation are domestic investments. Moreover, it is mainly implemented not by banks and
other financial intermediaries, but by existing enterprises (only partially they find external financial support
for their projects).  It is due to very high transaction costs of financial markets: enterprises do not trust
banks, banks do not trust enterprises, so profit goes either abroad, or into developing current business. As a
result, there are more immobile investment projects among implemented, then mobile ones. Regional
budgets’ tightness is well known also.
The interaction of regions is described as a dynamic game of 90 players (89 regions
and capital market ("dummy" player, whose behavior is described by capital supply
curve). Regions show Nash ("price-taker's") behavior in relation to country’s capital
market, but behave like monopolists in relation to their local demand for capital. It is a
close analogue of a game among many resellers of some commodity, buying it on the
open market, but selling it monopolistically on their closed home markets. More
specifically, in this repeated game all regions determine their taxes supposing current
profit rate to persist, these taxes influence capital demand, then capital market determines
temporary-equilibrium rate of profit, and so on. The equilibrium is defined as a bundle of
tax rates and rate of profit, equalizing the supply of capital and cumulative demand of all
regions, provided that it is not favorable to regions to change their current tax rates (Nash
equilibrium among 90 players).
Rationality hypothesis: Conscientious, or, rather, "milking-and-hoarding" type3 of
rational behavior of regional authorities is supposed (alternative types, like "hit-and-run",
or "behave-like-all" are neglected), that means pursuing tax revenue goals and
development goals. More specifically, each region knows the set of its investment
projects, i.e. its capital demand described by linearized "investment curve", and by
capital-supply mobility parameter: alternative net-profit rate. So, regional capital market
is almost like commodity market. Its Marshallian cross include some demand curve and
constant marginal costs, while profit tax is like ad valorem tax, property tax is unit tax.
The slight difference from commodity market is in tax-revenue formula: in contrast to ad
valorem taxation, profit tax base exclude property tax revenue, that modifies somewhat
the legislator’s behavior.
We suppose linear capital demand, for most results, or linearized demand (that is
much more general and realistic), the difference is in some constants modifying profit tax
revenue. Legislator optimizes either general rates of profit tax and property tax (simpler
version, similar to choosing combination of unit tax and ad valorem tax on commodity
market), or combination of these 2 tax rates and 2 corresponding tax relieves. Moreover,
if we suppose legislator to be able to discriminate in taxing several (say, n) types or
classes of capital within its region, then we should suppose not 4, but 4n optimization
variables. However, there is no need to include this complication into dynamic model; it
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 We mean that regional administration may be obsessed with tax revenue and development not only for
conscientious reasons, but also for egoistic motives, trying to accumulate more resources in its discretion.
Necessarily, this assumption, reminding “rational dictator” literature, implies long-term planning horizon of
a dictator, otherwise “hit and run” behavior seems probable.
3is almost4 the same as just introduce 89n regions instead.
  The objective function includes weighed sum of present and future tax revenue
(cumulatively weighed), and present and future capital. The latter term describes the
administration’s goal of “hoarding", that is development or employment within the
region, while the former displays “milking" goal. There is some tradeoff between the two.
This problem, both in short-term and in long-term variants, is similar to “Laffer curve"
problem, only the curve becomes a surface now, and two weighed goals instead of simple
revenue are pursued. It is solved within legal constraints on tax variables, and within the
budget constraint, determined by “vitally necessary" regional public spending.
Peculiarity of this tax-optimizing setting is motivated by our object: Russian capital.
Nevertheless, similarity to other known optimization problems prevails, so some
outcomes turn out to be rather typical, while some are problem-specific. Typical ones are
similar to textbook monopolist's price-discriminating problem, and to Ramsey's tax-
optimizing problem, they are: effectiveness of implementing tax discrimination and
relative effectiveness of profit tax.
Tax discrimination within a Russian region is practiced in several aspects: among
different industries (tax relieves for “weak” ones), between old capital and investment
(tax holidays), between domestic and foreign investments (privileges for foreign capital) ,
and some other types. Theoretically, it makes sense taxing tax-inelastic groups (say,
existing stable industries) more heavily, in comparison with tax-elastic ones, like new
capital, depressive industries, or foreign capital.  Indeed, Russian tax-discrimination
practice clearly shows this tendency. It is no wonder, comparing our problem with
standard price discrimination problem of a monopolist (Joan Robinson setting), or with
similar Ramsey's optimal taxation setting (optimal combination of unit taxes for several
commodity markets): both give the same advice.
How we should combine profit tax and property tax for some group of capital, say,
small business, within which we can not further discriminate? Monopolistic theory have
no advice for this case, while Ramsey's theory show preference for ad valorem taxation,
since it implicitly discriminates more profitable subgroups within legally identical group.
Our analysis do support this view, giving preference to profit tax, with some reservations
for the case of “very high” sensitivity to taxes: the answer turns out to be not general, but
value-dependent.5  Besides, analysis shows some specific details of optimal tax
combinations.
The motives of discrimination appear also in Section 2 considering dynamic game of
inter-regional tax competition (but dealing only with comparative statics, see general
concept in the beginning of the section).
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 The difference is in common regional-budget constraint connecting taxation problems of several groups of
capital within region. However, we believe that it does not affect the results.
5
 Surely, here we ignore tax evasion considerations, favorable for property tax and for unit tax. In contrast
with theoretical prescriptions to discriminate old capital that meet reality, the preference for profit-tax relief
is not observed in Russia, may be due to fear of tax evasion.
4There we assume no discrimination within regions (unless interpreting “regions” as
89n groups of capital, like above), but the result of tax competition is closely related to
optimal decision of imaginary coalition of these regions, that chooses  whole-country
optimal tax bundle, and, naturally, discriminates.
Therefore Nash outcome turns out to be Pareto optimal for the 89 administrations, at
least when short-term budget constraint is not binding. In essence, this fact is due to their
price-taking position in relation to capital supply, as explained in more detail in informal
proof of (hypothetical) Theorem 3, it is just 1-st Welfare Theorem consequence. This
situation is quite opposite to the case with mobile investment projects and mobile capital,
known as main version of Oates-Schwab model. If we assume in it (unlike Oates and
Schwab) no business interest in local public goods, then we obtain antagonistic game
among regions, resulting in famous “race for the bottom”, i.e. zero equilibrium taxes.6 In
our model we escape this disease due to immobility.
 However, it does not mean that study of our model gives additional unambiguous
theoretical arguments in favor of fiscal federalism, rather they are controversory. First of
all, efficiency notions are multiple, secondly, different assumptions yield different
outcomes, and thirdly – divergence effect may be supposed by some policy-makers to
overweigh efficiency benefits. We express these results (some of them are supported only
by informal reasoning or examples yet) as follows.
Study of game-theoretical tax competition model has shown, under the specified
assumptions, that the competition has following consequences for efficiency and regional
asymmetry.  A stationary point of this economy (an equilibrium) with tax competition
differs from an equilibrium without tax competition by the following features:
• When region’s short-term “budget constraint” does not play active role (that is
the case, in particular, when tax holidays are practiced), administrative efficiency is
achieved, i.e. goals of regional administrations achieved in equilibrium can not be
Pareto-improved. This implies fiscal efficiency, i.e. maximal total country’s tax revenue
– in special case when administrative goals consist only in long-term budget revenues,
and when capital demands are linear. Development efficiency of competition in the latter
case appears if and only if initial uniform tax rate was not optimal. Welfare efficiency
(total consumer’s and producer’s surplus, plus tax revenues), on the contrary, may be
enhanced or deteriorated by competition, depending upon initial state: if initial state was
optimal and all markets functioned, then competition makes losses.
• Take the case when region’s short-term “budget constraint” does play active role
only for some poor regions (suppose no tax holidays, demand linearity, and other
restrictions), while tax competition goes one-way, starting from the highest admissible
level of tax downwards. Then development efficiency of competition is present, together
with divergence (increasing asymmetry), and with usual presence of low-budget traps,
that is isolated low-capital equilibria for some or all regions, which can be avoided if
having more initial capital.
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 This tendency is observed indeed, but mainly in relation to some headquarters,  moving to Altai and
Ingushetia where taxes are very low, while we study real investment.
5Russian situation seems more close to the first of the two mentioned above situations:
regional tight budget constraints can be overcome by tax holidays. So, we should expect
no divergence of this type and no low-budget traps. However, traps (they are most
interesting for policy-makers, may be, among all effects) can well appear due to other
realistic features, not included in this version (see Fig.3 with comments).
Presentation goes as follows. Small subsection 0.1. presents some review of literature
and discussions around efficiency or inefficiency of fiscal federalism, and about realism
of different type of models. It explains our choice of model, and helps to position of our
study in this discussion: in essence, our paper enriches complex picture of various effects,
born by different assumptions.
Section 1 consisting of several subsections concerns the basic element of tax
competition models: region’s rational behavior model. Subsection 1.1 explains the
“investment curve” concept and related tax discrimination possibility. Subsection 1.1
introduces linearized investment curve and related formulae for finding investment
volume and tax revenue depending upon taxes. Next subsection generalizes the approach
to dynamic tax optimization formulation, and the last one describes solutions to the
formulated problem.
Section 2 presents several dynamic tax competition model versions, starting with
general construction and rough explanation of its performance. Then goes the simplest
version of the model, that allows for analytical results including divergence theorem, and
more elaborated models, with numerical examples and hints.
0.1. Review of literature:
          models of interregional tax competition and discussions
In federalism studies, there are different modifications of Tiebout's tax
competition model (Tiebout, 1956). The basic model assumes mobile participants of
economy (interpreted normally as households) who have different preferences concerning
public goods: transport service, police, education and others. Regional authorities are
supposed to be interested in attracting economic agents (tax-payers) by producing public
goods with some costs covered by tax revenue. Then for “large” number of regions, their
Nash competition for tax-payers must yield two effects: 1) Pareto-optimal level of taxes
and public goods in every region; moreover the taxes prove to be analogy of market price
of public good (benefit taxes), they can not be used for redistribution: transfers to poor,
etc.; 2)divergence, i.e. heterogeneity of regions with respect to all parameters: each region
is supposed to become a community ("Tiebout club") of tax-payers with approximately
same interest in public goods. These ideas strongly support federalism.
This theoretical model, being appropriate mainly for USA, became a starting point
for different modifications, also supporting tax federalism for efficiency reasons
(“conservative" point of view).
In particular, analogous efficiency conclusions were obtained for the case of
immobile population but capital mobility (Oates W., Schwab R., 1988). Controversial is
theoretical model by J.D.Wilson (Wilson J.,1987) describing tax competition in the
presence of two technologies: capital-intensive and labor-intensive. It shows that the
6competition induces divergence of regions into capital-intensive (applying low tax rates)
and labor-intensive (applying high tax rates) Tiebout groups, that can be inefficient due to
excessive transportation emerging and to wrong level of public good provision. However,
the revealed inefficiency is connected first of all with firms being indifferent to public
goods. This assumption would bore the same effect in Oates –Schwab model, moreover,
then competition results in zero taxes, that is named “race for the bottom”.
Opponents of tax federalism  (“liberals") criticize it mainly on egalitarian grounds,
defending large budget of social transfers, which they propose to finance at the expense of
taxes on business and on rich people, that is impossible in Tiebout game. Conservatives
object that it is the federal budget destined for social transfers. Actually it is not the case:
many regional authorities also practice essential redistribution, financing the poor at the
expenses of the reach (Reschovsky A., 1991). Tiebout forces should punish this practice.
Indeed, some empirical investigations confirm the hypothesis about firm's flight from
regions using redistributional programs (not simply high taxes, but taxes for redistribution
(Oates W., Schwab R., 1988)). How should we interpret these facts? Regional practice of
redistribution, contradicting to Tiebout's scheme of competition, may be evidence of too
slow work of Tiebout forces, or evidence of insufficient adequacy of Tiebout model even
for USA.
There are several factors, whose introduction into tax competition model could
explain the named gap with reality, among them imperfect taxpayer’s mobility (high costs
of reallocating existing firms, tec.).
Further, there is also important influence of political motivation of regional
authorities providing deviation from pure Tiebout's competition. In particular, in
(Shannon J, 1991) the effect of “pacesetter phenomenon" is described, also called
"Stockholm syndrome": usually “a piece of radical legislation gets passed by the Swedes,
then it's flown directly to the U.S. and is passed into law in California. Then it's flown to
Wisconsin. Then to New York. By the time it gets to Mississippi, which is about four
years later, it's a national birth-right." This political effect is very prominent in financing
educational programs (which provide not only redistribution but also benefits for firms
and for households). Those states, where historically level of expenditures on education is
not high, are not satisfied with (prescribed by Tiebout’s model) role of just being a “club"
for firms and households not demanding education. These states prefer to imitate their
educated neighbors and make super-efforts not to fell behind in this field. As a result of
the imitation, taxes and expenditures on public goods increased gradually (very
significantly) in 20-th century in all states. Now states look like one compact cluster in
this field (“a convoy"), in contradiction with Tiebout prediction.
The point is that politicians are afraid of political critique, which is therefore a factor
mitigating Tiebout tax competition effects. In essence, not only consumers has influence
on regional authorities, “voting by legs" according to Tiebout model, but also electorate
voting with bulletins. Elections counterbalance anti-redistributional Tiebout-like stimulus
of regional authorities. Exactly this counteraction of the two stimulus is approved by
conservative theorists, defending tax competition: it does not allow voting poor to rob too
much the rich, and, what is more important for us, to rob business (affecting the future
population of this region). These reasons become especially important in Russian
conditions because of prevalence of poor politically shortsighted voter.
7Observations of "imitation" practice make possible to agree with applicability of
"diffusion of innovations " models to the considered area, proposed in the studies
(Coleman J., Menzel H., Katz E., 1959), (Reinganum J., 1981), (Salmon P., 1987). The
basic assumption, in contradistinction to Tiebout model is incomplete
information/rationality of the participants and other factors of delay ("stickiness") in the
innovations spreading. It is recognized, that they produce S -shaped or logistical curve of
innovations spreading in time: rare first examples, then mass application, fading on rare
exclusions. Besides incomplete information, a factor of delay is slowness of political
process in each region. These considerations make us doubt about what we observe in
each case: an equilibrium, or just slowly moving disequilibrium. Changes in incomes, in
demand and in technologies in the post-war period goes by rates comparable with the
rates of tax innovations, that does not allow to see a stable state. It is considered to be an
observable fact, and it is incorrectly named “equilibrium instability" in (Breton A., 1991),
mixed with race for zero level of the taxes - "race for the bottom" (in particular, the
reduction of income taxes in megapolice suburbs is observed).
Another deviation from Tiebout concept of regional authorities’ motivation is
described as “cooperative federalism” (Elazar D., 1991). Like competing oligopolists,
regions are capable in some moment to switch onto cooperative behavior. Difference is
that such behavior of regions is ideologically approved, it can be maintained by federal
authority and can have legislative mechanisms for the agreements maintenance.
Cooperative behavior is observed in many inter- regional joint projects and affairs.
Nevertheless, in the field of tax competition it is supposed to appear only when mutual
losses from competition will not be considered by the participants as “rather significant ".
This threshold is supposed being low in Canada (Elazar D., p. 66), with its few regions,
where it is easier to reach an agreement. Potential agreement, which can be registered as
federal legislative act (without the consent of part of regions either), is a discreet political
event, interrupting, not smoothing the interregional competition. So, it can be
incorporated into tax competition model only as a threshold, stopping it.
Among the studies of Russian regional competition for business, close to our topic
is the stochastic model of tax-holidays optimization by a single region (Arkin, V.,
Slastnikov, A., Shevtsova, E., 1999) (	
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contrast with our study, optimal choice is not coordinated with budget needs and two-tax
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and decrees. Interesting paper of  L.Polishchuk (Polishchuk L., 1999) reveals motives of
tax relives, and doubt, by the way, in their efficiency.
 
Paper (Kuznestova, 1998)
comparatively study two similar neighboring regions: Novgorod and Pskov. It states
important role of regional tax policy, and drastic superiority of tax-holiday granting
region – Novgorod, expressed in all economic indices.
Relying on different ideas mentioned, we stopped our choice of tax competition
model for Russia on some modification of Oates-Schwab model, characterized by
imperfectly mobile capital.
81.  Tax optimization on investment curve: use of discrimination and
two-tax combinations
We start our study of tax competition with revealing the structure of tax
optimization problem solved by a single regional authority, referred further as Legislator.
Then this rational behavior model becomes an element of the game model.
 1.0. Clarifying remarks
We shall argue only in gross-regional-product terms. Thus we abstract from essential
but complicated inter-industry differences. We shall speak mostly of  “investment'', but
one can easily transfer the same argument to the problem of underloading the existing
industrial capacities, if they are sensitive to taxes, and, with some reservations, to taxing
commodity markets. Simplifying further, we shall optimize w.r.t. only 2 tax variables:
property tax and profit tax. Other taxes, including most important VAT, are supposed to
reducible to combination of the two taxes considered (see Appendix) .
Many realistic considerations, that can well abolish applicability of our deduction,
like corruption, irrationality, etc. – are beyond the scope of this study. We do also abstract
from risks and from time schedule of gathering taxes, all these are supposed to be reduced
on mean-present-value basis to comparable permanent-profit terms. Thus we ignore the
fact that tax holidays are usually preferred by entrepreneurs to present-value-equivalent
permanent tax relieves, we display both in the same manner as “tax relieves”.
Accordingly, “net profit'' notion below will mean “steady warranted profit'' (depreciation
subtracted), comparable to the interest rate that an investor may get for reliable tax-
cleared securities in US or Europe, say 5-6%.
Further, we shall consider here only conscientious-rational behavior, that is
maximizing development and tax revenues of the region, we do not touch other types
existing.7 Therefore, the sense of our study is to reveal effects connected with this type of
behavior only, putting aside other effects.
 1.1. Basic investment curve and mobility curve, “perfect” discrimination
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 Relying on L.Polishchuk's paper we can construct at least four hypothetical models of legislative and
administrative behavior of regional authorities, apparent plausible. We shall describe them in stylized
manner. 1) ''Novgorod'' model (long-term altruistic, rational): the administration have professional motives,
aspiring future well-being of the region, it designs consecutive strategy of attracting investments. 2)
''Ulyanovsk'' (short-term rational) model: the administration tries to achieve current well-being, together
with success in the nearest elections, it deserves preservation of employment and guarantees to the
population at any cost, including significant sacrifices from the profitable enterprises, subsidies for
unprofitable ones. 3) ''Pskov'' (predatory) model: the administration, aspiring to increase its personal
authority and property, regularly demonstrates to the enterprises its own ability them to rise or ruin them, to
grab share of assets - or just political loyalty and support. 4) Irrationally-imitative model: regions just copy
patterns of behavior from their neighbors, patterns which are considered ''progressive'' for some reasons.
This can be born by information imperfections of the political game. At the given stage we could only
empirically confirm that behavior of 1-th and 4-th types is present. We also study some variants of the 1-st
type analytically.
9We need formula for expected investments in a region, depending upon profit and
taxes. It should describe regional  demand  for capital, that is investment possibilities. Let
us construct this  “investment curve''.
Suppose, there are some investment projects, characterized by investment volume
and gross profit. After ordering them in descending manner, we get the needed function
I, where I(p) describes total possible investments with profit exceeding  p. For instance,
such function born by 3 investment projects, having volumes 30, 15, 20 - see on Fig.1.
(for realistic samples see Appendix).
   Meeting this demand-curve with a capital-supply curve, presented on Fig.1 by
straight line, should give equilibrium, i.e. actual investments. Such flat supply -curve is
defined by fixed “alternative-profit' rate”, i.e. the net profit rate available for investors
somewhere else. In some cases this line may be not straight, due to different “alternative-
profit' rates” for different projects.
   How much tax revenue regional administration can earn facing given investment
curve and supply-curve? It depends upon its ability to discriminate among projects, and
upon alternative profit that each project can earn in another region. Supposing that
alternative profit of all the investors in question is the same (vertical line on Fig.1), and
that the administration has legal and intellectual ability to fully discriminate, then
legislator can grab the whole potential profit of the region without harm to investment
and to production!
On Fig.1 this maximal-possible tax revenue becomes the whole integral between the
investment curve and the line of alternative profit. Then the taxes levied upon all projects
(property taxes, on this picture) are equal to expected profits. This solution is a direct
analogue of well-known “ideal price discriminating'' by monopolist. Some its version,
though restricted by federal law, is practiced in Novgorod region (see Appendix).
Possible non-uniform alternative profits of the projects describe their  mobility: when
projects' alternative profit  is uniform, it means uniform mobility. To calculate maximal-











Figure 1.   Investment curve and two different alternative-profit curves: with uniform mobility and non-
uniform mobility. Maximal possible tax revenue is the integral between the investment curve, and the
alternative-profit curve.
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graph from capital demand graph, and take the integral between the two curves. Thus,
generally, capital demand curve and mobility allow us to see full taxable resources of a
region.
The monopolistic arguments show, that legislator in this position can overcome
Lafferian contradiction between tax revenue and production volume, if being able to
discriminate among projects (units of capital); discrimination enables to combine both
goals on maximal level. This practice has some support among policy-makers, even for
being implemented in the whole country. In essence it is a rent-extracting practice. Its
most noticeable example is production-sharing agreements with oil-, gas- and other
extracting enterprises. Observing obvious fiscal arguments in favor of tax-discrimination
practice, we see only minor welfare arguments against it by now. The only clear welfare-
based counter-argument is that such practice, equalizing net profits, can slow down the
effective flows of capital from less profitable to more profitable industries and sectors,
but this effect appears only at the limit, for complete discrimination, that is not practiced.
 Even most smart and organized regional administrations usually manage to
discriminate in taxation only among following groups of production: 1)between existing
facilities and new investment (most important in Russian practice division); 2)among
individual large investment projects, by fixing different ``repay dates'' for them
(``Novgorod model'', see Appendix); 3)between large and ``small'' business; 4)among
several industries, in favour of depressive ones, while region-large enterprises are
sometimes treated similarly (by special legislative act); 5)among several localities, in
favour of depressive ones; 6)between domestic and foreign capital (taking into account
different mobility of them).8
By these simple considerations we conclude discussing the discrimination topic, well
known to theorists in other context. In closest paragraphs we shall not mention
discrimination at all, except the discrimination between existing facilities and new
investment. The point is, that tax-optimization problem can be (if putting aside unique
“budget constraint'' of our region) decomposed into several optimization problems: one
task for each class of enterprises, each with its own “investment curve''. If further
discrimination within the given class is supposed impossible, then that constitutes the
non-trivial problem of optimal tax mixture to be solved now.
As well as discrimination, we shall not further consider non-uniform mobility curves
in this study.
 1.2. Linearized investment curve.
Consider capital-demand curve of a single class of enterprises (or of the whole
region, if we are not able to discriminate). In the Appendix examples the class is “new
capital”, i.e. investment. Let us assume that the piece of the curve, supposed being
affected by possible regional tax shifts - is not too tricky, that its concavity or convexity
does not play essential role. Then we can linearize the curve on this interval as described
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 Once again, we warn here not to mix the discussed here logical outcomes of theoretically-possible honest
regional behavior with Russian present corruption in discriminating capital.
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in the Appendix. However, we do linearize the curves even in spite of their tricky
character. After all, it is only general expected investment sensitivity to taxes that matters
for regional administration. It is a stochastic notion. Kinks and jumps of investment
curves may fluctuate from one year to another, while the taxation must be stable,
reflecting average tendency, so the average curve’s slope matters more then temporary
kinks.
   Let us explain the notation related, and the formulae born by this triangular capital-
demand model. A linear investment curve is determined by two constants: 1)maximal
possible investment9 denoted Im or Imax  ; 2) normalized “slope constant”  g, such that
expected investment is  I(p) =  Im⋅(1-gP), when the required by investors alternative profit
rate P is given. Without scale factor Im  the investment curve (1-gP) will be called
normalized one, it relates to technology of the region, while scale factor – to size of the
region. Maximal possible gross profit is  Pm=1/g (that is the profit of the best available
project on the triangle).
It means, that the more profit rate investors desire – the less investment they will
make in our region, according to available regional projects. In more correct terms, this
curve describes  gross  profit rate  P(I) =Pm-I/g  that  I-th small unit of capital can yield,
being implemented in our region. In contrast, investors are comparing regions by
alternative net profit. Let us express its impact on investment.
Suppose absence of taxes and an alternative net profit (profit available in some other
region for investors) being  π . Then, surplus rate of profit  S  (in comparison with an
alternative region) that the  I-th unit of capital can yield in our region is  S(I) = (Pm-I/g) –π
, so, equalizing  S(I) to zero, expected normalized investments are  I= (1/g -π )g.
Now recall that our linear investment curve (triangle) may be born by linearizing
more complex curve on the interval affected by taxes. Then a compensating constant  Pc
(positive or negative) must be added to gross profit  Pm=1/g  of the best triangle’s project,
so that real Pmax =Pm+Pc. Accordingly, we should add some compensating constant  CI
describing the integral between the real and the linearized curve (see Appendix), when
calculating the taxation base for profit tax (however, we shall suppose CI=0= Pc  in
special cases).
 1.3. Formulae describing impact of two taxes and tax revenue.
Now, if we introduce property tax denoted  x<1, the profit surplus of I-th project
discussed above becomes  S(I) = (Pm-I/g) –π -x. Further, when profit tax  y is also present,
the same surplus takes the shape  S(I) = (Pm-I/g) –π -x– (Pm-I/g-x)y. We have taken into
account, that taxation base for profit tax is not the gross profit of  I-th capital unit itself
(Pm-I/g), but the reduced volume  (Pm-I/g-x), i.e. the volume corrected by property tax.
  Accordingly, having in mind the supply of capital presented by alternative net-profit
rate π, we can derive the number  I  of the last (worst) unit of capital implemented in our
region. We should solve w.r.t.  I  the following linear equation, describing investor’s
choice:
                                                          
9
 Notation: Upper index-letters will be used throughout as accents everywhere, not as power-marks or
indices, unless being numerical or parenthesized. All indices will be lower ones, powers – in parentheses.
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                 S(I) = (Pm-I/g) –π -x– (Pm-I/g-x)y=0 .
Solution for normalized investment is
 I= I(x,y) = g(Pm-π -x-yPm+yx)/(1-y) = (1 -gπ -gx-y+gyx)/(1-y),
so real investment is10
Im I(x,y) = Im(1 -gπ -gx-y+gyx)/(1-y).
Further, when total volume of investment implemented in our region  is a number  I=
I(x,y), then the expected normalized annual revenue from property tax levied on all these
investments is  x*I(x,y).  Let us derive region's normalized revenue from profit tax
analogously. We see that for linear investment curve the best available profit-tax base,
that is the profit rate of the best unit of capital, or of the best investment project, whose
number is  0, is  Pm-x=1/g-x (property tax subtracted).
Naturally, the worst profit-tax base is the profit rate of the worst project numbered
I(x,y),  that is I(x,y)/g-x (property tax subtracted). Then, exploiting linearity, we get the
average profit-tax base magnitude B(x,y) =  0.5* I(x,y)(1/g-x+ I(x,y)/g-x) = I(x,y)(1/2+
I(x,y)/2-xg)/g. However, if non-linear was the investment curve  before our linearization,
then that real maximal profit differs from our parameter  Pm, and some constant  CI
should be added to tax base, so, generally the normalized tax base is  B(x,y) = I(x,y)(1/2+
I(x,y)/2-xg)/g+CI.
So the normalized profit-tax revenue of our region is  (y-Yfed)(0.5· I(x,y)(1-
I(x,y)+2xg)/g+CI) (we subtract here quantitity Yfed =0.13 i.e. profit tax belonging by law
to federal budget). Then total normalized tax revenue from investments  RI ,  related to
property tax and profit tax is
 RI=RI(x,y) =x· I+(y-0.13)· (I(1/2+I/2-xg)/g+CI) =
 =I· [x+(y-0.13)· ((1/2+I/2-xg)/g)]+(y-0.13)CI,
where investment volume I  is derived as  I= I(x,y) = (1-gπ -gx-y+gyx)/(1-y).
Finally, we substitute now I, and change also specific values of federal share in
property tax Xfed=0, and in profit tax Yfed=0.13 for their general form. Then we obtain
general (applicable for different countries) tax-revenue-from-investments formula in
terms of initial parameters (normalized):
 RI(x,y) = (1-gπ -gx-y+gyx)/(1-y)[(x- Xfed )+(y- Yfed)· ((1/2+
 +((1-gπ -gx-y+gyx)/(1-y))/2-xg)/g)]+(y- Yfed)CI,
while the real total revenue is  ImRI(x,y).
Exactly the same logic as with investment, we can apply to find volume of operating
old weak facilities (capital) Kw and, accordingly, to find revenue from this capital. Saying
“weak”, we mean industries and firms being close to bankruptcy, we oppose them to
“strong” or “normal” industries, touched later. All existing weak facilities we denote Kw,
                                                          
10
 Consider alternative case: different taxation law, when taxation base for profit tax does not exclude
property tax. One can check, that similar investment formula would look like Im I(x,y) = Im(1 -gπ -gx-y)/(1-
y). This case is equivalent to taxing commodity market with mixture of  unit tax (analogue of profit tax) and
ad valorem tax (analogue of profit tax). So, it is (+gyx) component, the minor difference in the two
formulae, that prevents expanding our analysis onto commodity markets.
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that is the scale factor similar to former parameter Im. “Weak” facilities may be under-
loaded or can be closed. So, production is sensitive to taxes  (x,y)  with some sensitivity
factor  q,  and sensitive to alternative closure-profit  pK that the owner can earn closing
and selling these capital units (often below we suppose  pK=0). Then, we derive
normalized weak capital as:
 Kw(x,y) = (1-qpK-qx-y+gyx)/(1-y), and scaled weak capital is  Kw Kw(x,y), formula
for tax revenue RKw(x,y) gained from weak capital is similar to RI(x,y), (please, note, that
our normalized functions I,R,K are bold-faced, while numbers are in normal font).
Now we should explain similar formula for tax revenue from “strong” or “normal”
old capital. The formula must be based on trapeze, rather then on triangle, in contrast with
previous ones. Indeed, postpone issues of complex dynamics, and suppose, that our
region have long been in stationary position: the same alternative profit rate π, the same
taxes (x,y), the same investment possibilities (Im, g). Then, if not taking into account other
circumstances, our old-capital profile must have exactly the same shape as our investment
triangle, only without the upper part, i.e. without the projects, whose gross profit is less
then (π+x). It is a trapeze. Another difference from the investment triangle is that scaling
factor for normal old capital must be 1/(1-a) times more, if 0<a<1 is the depreciation
factor. That is Ks= Im /(1-a), say, capital is10 times more then investments annually.
This flat roof of capital demand curve is the cause of important for our study effect:
normal old capital must be insensitive to taxes, (at least in some vicinity of previous
taxes)! Indeed, suppose that all investments for the last 10 years were accomplished
expecting 5% normal net profit and 2% usual property tax. Assume no unexpected events
in business for 10 years (not realistic assumption, of course). Then there is no capital in
our region with gross profit less then 7%. So, decreasing taxes have no impact on
currently operating capital at all, and increasing property tax have no impact also, until it
exceed 7%, that is until it completely rob out normal profit! We shall assume such
excesses not probable, so operating normal capital will be just a constant equal to all
previously accumulated normal capital Ks.
Accordingly, normalized tax revenue from it will be (we calculate trapeze square,
diminished according to “reduced tax base” rule, to find revenue from profit tax, the
trapeze being the part of investment triangle):
RKs(x,y) = (x- Xfed) +(y-Yfed) 0.5 (π+1/g -x)(1-g π-g x) + (y- Yfed)CI, while real revenue
is Ks RKs(x,y).
The model would be more accurate, if we used not current net profit rate  π  in this
formula, but different profit for each portion of old capital, namely the rate that was
operating, when this portion was born, tracking back all the history. However, we believe
that normal profit rate in the country do not change too essentially, so such complication
of the model looks excessive.
 Now, where “weak” capital comes from? The model can not do without additional
assumption, in particular, we suppose exogenous parameter of “dispersion” 0<d<1 – this
is the share of normal capital that stochastically annually becomes “weak” due to different
market circumstances: Kw = d Ks . This assumption we throughout.
In this case, sensitivity of total (weak and strong) old capital to taxes depends upon
two parameters: d,q. When d is small, sensitivity is small, but generally it can be larger or
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smaller then sensitivity g of new capital. The sensitivity difference is crucial for choosing
between tax holidays, and general tax reduction: when g sensitivity is larger, then there is
more need in tax holidays.
We resume, total current real tax revenue is (Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y)). It should not
be added to revenue from investments ImRI(x,y), because the latter describes future
revenue.
Now with the help of these formulae we should argue about optimization patterns.
1.4. STATIC OPTIMAL 2-TAX MIXTURE:
       tradeoff between employment and tax revenue
Let us abstract for a while from tradeoff between current and future objectives, from
all other time considerations. Suppose, our region choose “only once, today” its taxation
strategy  (x,y), concerning only investments of one future period, influenced by taxation.
This period, when the taxation will operate, can be next year after the decision, or
another, the decision does not influence present time.
Our region may be supposed to have development or production objective
(investment as such), revenue objective, and employment objective. However, if we
suppose employment to be connected with capital (investment) by a simple linear
relationship (production yield employment), then there is no tradeoff between these two
objectives, so no need in introducing separate employment variable. In contrast, there can
be tradeoff between current tax revenue objective and production/employment objective.
This tradeoff is well known as the upward wing of the Laffer curve. Therefore, a region
should compare (weigh) somehow these two objectives in its utility function. We suppose
the simplest linear form, with weight denoted w3 =wr∈ [0,1] for tax revenues, and with
weigh w4 =we= (1-wr) for capital or investment as such (i.e. for employment, or
production). Then objective function takes the form
                  U(x,y) =wrR1(x,y)+(1-wr)I(x,y),
where functions R1,I  are derived above. This optimization problem can be viewed
upon as a version of Laffer problem, generalized in respect that now we face a Laffer
surface  U(x,y) instead of a Laffer curve U(y), and that we combine 2 objectives instead of
one revenue objective.
We should optimize this function w.r.t. tax variables  (x,y),  subject to legal and
natural constraints:
                   Xmin ≤ x≤ Xmax ,  Ymin ≤ y≤ Ymax  .
Initially we supposed reasonable to take only legal bounds on property and profit
taxes  0=Xmin , Xmax =0.02, 0.13=Ymin , Ymax =0.35, prescribed by Russian law. Later we
generalized the setting, and included also the parameter  Xfed > 0,  to describe VAT
component going to federal budget (see explanation in Appendix).  This modification
changed the bounds, but not the essence of constrained maximization11.
   One additional constraint is “budget'' constraint:
                            G≤ R1(x,y),
                                                          
11
 In principle, the lower bounds on taxes can be overcome by subsidies, but it is not practiced. Exception is
Novgorod'd region promise to subsidise federal taxes to new enterprises in depressive subregions, but none
invested yet.
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where G denotes necessary regional budget spending in the considered year.
Somebody would object that most regions in Russia do not cover their expenditures. Then
Gr  should denote the volume that really “must” be covered, in opinion of the authorities
(after taking into account transfers from federal budget and available debts and arrears).
The constraint should also participate in optimization, but it can be reflected simply
by including a Langrange multiplier  ρ  , just adding it to the revenue weight  wr. The
tighter is the budget constraint, the greater is  ρ , and, accordingly, the weight of revenue
objective. Until turning to country's dynamics, it makes no difference for us, how (ρ+ wr)
changes, so we can simply suppose ρ  included into wr during studying the Lagrangian,
and impose no explicit budget constraint.
 Therefore, the corresponding Lagrangian (with dual variables li , mi) becomes
    L(x,y, l1, l2, m3, m4) =U(x,y)+ l1(x-Xmin) – l2(x-Xmax)+ m3 (y-Ymin) – m4(y-Ymax).
In the next  subsection we shall formulate more general problem, including this one
as a special case, then discuss the solutions.
1.5. DYNAMIC TAX-OPTIMIZING SETTING:
 tradeoff between current and future goals
Now let us take into account dynamic aspects. It deserves optimizing taxes on new
capital (investment) and on old capital simultaneously. This can be done in several
reasonable fashions. We shall try to explain why some simplified solutions seem
plausible, and how we should convert dynamic setting into the pseudo-static one.
  1.5.1. Stable-expectations stable-strategy setting (but for changing capital)
We imagine a farsighted administration, trying to chose taxation scheme today for the
whole future, having in mind the plan period  T (may be,  T=∞ ). We does not mean that
if conditions tomorrow change, the legislator will not change the solution. He/she
probably will, but it will be again a solution for the whole new horizon T , expecting
stable conditions again.
We may speak here of optimizing taxes for the whole region, or for a single industry,
logic is the same. It can be also a special class of business, chosen to be taxed; let us
speak of an ``industry''. Suppose that for the industry our legislator know its current
capital stock of old capital Kw ,Ks  (weak and strong), and all other relevant parameters
q,CK, pK. In addition, let legislator expect stable future investment curve parameters  Im,g,
CK,π 12, and a stable capital depreciation parameter  a<1.
Generally speaking, having in mind the plan period  T, now very many  (namely, 4*T)
taxation variables should be chosen simultaneously instead of former 2 variables. Indeed,
for each year t we can chose property and profit taxes  (xtK,ytK) for existing facilities, and
also taxes  (xtI,ytI) for new capital (investment), since our region can discriminate between
old and new capital.
                                                          
12
 Notation  p=p K everywhere mean profit, like π.  Stable parameters mean, that new emerging investment
projects constitute each period the same new investment curve, projects are not exhausted.
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However, it is too complex a problem, both for us and for legislators. Therefore, we
shall neglect the possibility13 to chose taxation strategy as a non-trivial trajectory
(xtK,ytK,xtI,ytI)t=1T. We believe, that legislation can not be changed each year. Hence, we
shall optimize “once and for all times'', so we need only 4 variables  (xK,yK,xI,yI). May be,
they should obey the constraint  (xI,yI)≤ (xK,yK), if the law permits only tax holidays for
investment, but not discriminating investment. It is more or less realistic, though existing
tax relieves for almost-dead enterprises violate such constraint, may be. If included in
optimization, the constraint can be expressed also as  (xI,yI) = (s*xI,t*yI),  (s,t)≤ (1,1),
where  (s,t) denote tax relieves or tax-holiday present values.
We can suppose some lag  L ≥ 0 for new investments to become capital, and expect
related revenue only starting from L-th year after investment. However, simultaneously
we should take into account yesterday’s investments (already being implemented) and
summarize them until L. Therefore, it is not a great simplification to suppose L =0
insofar.
To construct the needed utility function, we should express tradeoff between current
and future goals. We shall take usual “future utility'' concept, introduced in the form of
discounted infinite sum of temporary utility gains, with a discount rate  δ  - patience
factor (say,  δ =0.95). As previously, we shall attach weight w1 to tax-revenue goal of n-th
year Rev(n,x,y) and weight w2- to production/employment goal Kap(n,x,y) of n-th year, to
form the objective function:
U(x,y) = ∑n=0Tδ(n) (w1 Rev(n,x,y,xs,yt)+ w2 Kap(n,x,y,xs,yt) ).
Now we should substitute Rev(.) and  Kap(.)  in the objective function by exact
formulae for capital and revenue, to convert dynamic problem into pseudo-static one.
To do this, we should distinguish revenue from old capital  K0 or (Kw , Ks ) and
revenue from new capital, because different taxes may be applied to them (the promised
now holidays must operate in future). All new capital will operate under new taxes
denoted further  σ =sx,x =ty, which describe present value of tax holidays .14 Stable
taxation we suppose.
Our expected present value of future (n=1,2,...) stream of revenue from the old (born
before 1999 and older, if we are deciding in 1999) capital,  is based on the declining, due
to depreciation, capital sequence   a(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks),  a(2)(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks), a(3)(Kw
Kw(x,y)+ Ks),.... We can express this utility stream gained from weak and strong old
capital until year T  as:
 UT(old)(x,y) =∑n=0Tδ(n) a(n) [w1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y))+w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks)] ,
where (Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y)) = [Kw [ (1-qp -qx-y+qyx)/(1-y)[(x- Xfed )+
+(y- Yfed)· ((1/2+ ((1-qp -qx-y+qyx)/(1-y))/2-xq)/q)]+(y- Yfed)CK]+
+ Ks [ (x- Xfed) +(y-Yfed) 0.5 (π+x+1/g)(1-g π-g x) + (y- Yfed)CI]].
                                                          
13
 This can happen when, in contrast with the stable-strategy setting, when the legislator is short-sighted or
too much impatient to get tax revenue, for whatever reasons. Or, maybe, rapid growth or rapid decline of a
region forces legislator to solve dynamic-dynamic rather then stable-dynamic problem.
14
 Of cause, it borns some bias in the below estimate: present value of eternal present-value tax relief does
not quite correctly reflect the loss of revenue for region from tax holidays. We suppose it not too high.
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Somewhat differently we should express our utility stream from young capital.
Stable taxation under the assumed stable circumstances implies also stable expected
investment  I = Im I(σ ,x ). We estimate current younger-then-1999 capital stock of a
future year  n  as  Kn(new) =aKn-1(new)+I .  Using standard progression formula we get new
capital K n(new) = ∑k=1n a(k)I= I*(a(n+1) –a)/(a-1) = Im I(σ ,x )*(a(n+1) –a)/(a-1).
So,  we express our present value of future utility, gained from young capital until
year T  as
UT(young)(σ ,x ) =∑n=1Tδ (n) (a(n+1) –a)/(a-1) [w1 Im RI(σ ,x) +w2 Im I(σ ,x )]=
=∑n=1Tδ (n) [w1 Im *(a(n+1) –a)/(a-1)]* I(σ ,x ) [ [σ -Xfed+(x -Yfed)·((1/2+ I(σ ,x )/2-
- σ  g)/g)] +(y- Yfed)CI+w2].
Now, combining the above expressions, supposing infinite horizon T=∞,  we can
express the objective function as
U(x,y) = UT(old)(x,y)+ UT(young)(σ ,x ) =
=∑n=0Tδ(n) a(n) [w1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y))+w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks)]+
+∑n=0Tδ (n) (a(n+1) –a)/(a-1) [w1 Im RI(σ ,x) +w2 Im I(σ ,x )]=
=1/(1− δ a) *[w1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y))+w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks)]+
+ a/(a− 1)* [1/(1− δ a ) − 1/(1 − δ )][w1 Im RI(σ ,x) +w2 Im I(σ ,x )].
That means utility function having following weights: weight v1= w1/(1− δ a)  for
revenue depending upon taxes (x,y) (“old-capital revenue”),  weight v2= w2/(1− δ a)  for
related capital (“old-type capital”), weight v3= w1 a/(a− 1)* [1/(1− δ a ) − 1/(1 − δ )]  for
revenue depending upon taxes (σ ,x) (“future young-capital revenue”), weight v4= w2
a/(a− 1)* [1/(1− δ a ) − 1/(1 − δ )]  for related capital (“future young capital”).
Thus we have related our multi-period objective function to some pseudo-static or,
rather, two-period function with weights (v1 ,v2 , v3 , v4) weighing “today” revenue and
capital depending upon (x,y) with “tomorrow” revenue and capital depending upon (σ ,x).
We optimize it as if today capital is supposed to disappear tomorrow.
If we assume the constraint on tax relieves (σ ,x)≤ (x,y) not binding, then
optimization of this function can be decomposed into 2 separate problems (dropping
constant multipliers) that happens to be just static problems:
UT(old)(x,y)  ->  maxx,y
UT(young)(σ ,x)  ->  maxσ ,x  .
So, impatience δ  and depreciation  a  play no role when tax holidays are essentially
used!
Take more general case, including the case when tax relieves or holidays are
unavailable: (σ ,x)= (x,y). Then impatience and depreciation factors play some role in the
resulting total pseudo-static or 2-period objective function, similar to the case, when all
current capital becomes obsolete during a year, while all next-year capital results from
investment:
U(x,y, σ ,x) = UT(old)(x,y)+ UT(young)(σ ,x ) =
=v1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y))+ v2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks) +
+ v3 Im RI(σ ,x) + v 4 Im I(σ ,x ),
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where variables  (σ ,x) =  (xs, yt),
coefficients v1= w1/(1− δ a) , v2= w2/(1− δ a),
         v3= w1 a/(a− 1)* [1/(1− δ a ) − 1/(1 − δ )],
   v
 4= w2 a/(a− 1)* [1/(1− δ a ) − 1/(1 − δ )].
However, it will be more convenient for us to normalize further these coefficients, it
makes no difference for optimization:
                 v1= w1,     v2= w2,     v3= w1Ccoeff ,     v4= w2 Ccoeff ,
         Ccoeff = a/ (a− 1) /(1− δ a)* [1/(1− δ a ) − 1/(1 − δ )].
How large can be Ccoeff ? For instance, Ccoeff(a=0.9,δ=0.5) =  2.97521,
Ccoeff(a=0.9,δ=0.6) = 6.37996, Ccoeff(a=0.9,δ=0.7) = 15.3397, thus even with rather
low patience 0.5, weight v3 of future revenue in objective function is substantial.
For the below Theorem 2 we shall optimize this function w.r.t. x, supposing tax
relieves or tax holidays unavailable: (s,t) = (1,1), so (σ ,x)= (x,y). The function is a power-
2 polynomial w.r.t. x, like    Ax(2)+Bx+H.  These factors A,B,H  we should express now in
initial terms.
Into new function U(x,y,xs,yt)  we should substitute the earlier expressions for
revenue, capital and investment (denoting pK=p further), thus we obtain the below
package of
formulae for pseudo-static optimization:
K(old)(x,y) = (Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks
 
),   Kw(x,y) = (1- q p- q x-y+g y x)/(1-y),
R(old)(x,y) = Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y),
RKs(x,y) = (x- Xfed) +(y-Yfed) 0.5 (π-x+1/g)(1-g π-g x) + (y- Yfed)CI,                 (1-1)
RKw(x,y) = (1-q p –q x- y+ q y x)/(1-y)[(x- Xfed )+(y- Yfed)· ((1/2+
               +((1-q p –q x-y+ q y x)/(1-y))/2-xq)/q)]+(y- Yfed)CK,
K(young)(xs,yt) = Im I(xs,yt) = Im (1-g π -g xs- yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt),
R(young)(xs,yt) = Im RI(xs,yt) = Im ((1-g π -g xs- yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt)[(xs- Xfed )+
  +(yt- Yfed)· ((1/2+ ((1-gπ -g xs- yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt))/2-xsg)/g)]+(yt- Yfed)CI),
Subject to budget constraint (Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y))   ≥  G, and to legal bounds on
(x,y), we optimize function
U(x,y,xs,yt) =    UT(old)(x,y)+ UT(young)(xs,yt) =                                                  (1-2)
             = w1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y)) + w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks) +
                     +  v3 Im RI(xs,yt) + v4 Im I(xs,yt ) =
=w1 Kw ( (1-q p –q x- y+ q y x)/(1-y)[(x- Xfed )+ (y- Yfed)·((1/2+
               +((1-q p –q x-y+ q y x)/(1-y))/2-xq)/q)]+ (y- Yfed)CK ) +
        + w1 Ks ( (x- Xfed) +(y-Yfed) 0.5 (π-x+1/g)(1-g π-g x) + (y- Yfed)CI ) +
+ w2 ( Kw (1- q p- q x-y+g y x)/(1-y)+ Ks ) +
+ v3 Im ((1-g π -g xs- yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt)[(xs- Xfed )+
       +(yt- Yfed)· ((1/2+ ((1-gπ -g xs- yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt))/2-xsg)/g)]+(yt- Yfed) CI ) +
+v4 Im (1-g π -g xs- yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt)     =    Ax(2)+B x+H,    
where
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H = (2*Ks*w2 - 2*Ks*w1*Xfed + 2*CI*Im*v3*(y - Yfed) +                        (1-3)
   + 2*(CI*Ks + CK*Kw)*w1*(y - Yfed) +
   +  Ks*(g(-1) + π)*(1 - g*π)*w1*(y - Yfed) +
   + (Kw*(-1 + p*q + y)*(2*w1*(-1 + y)*(y - Yfed) +
   +  q*(2*w2*(-1 + y) + w1*(2*Xfed + p*y - 2*Xfed*y –
-  p*Yfed))))/ (q*(-1 + y)(2)) + (Im*(-1 + g*π + y)* (2*v3*(-1 + y)*(y - Yfed) +
     + g*(2*v4*(-1 + y) + v3*(2*Xfed + π*y - 2*Xfed*y –
- π*Yfed))))/ (g*(-1 + y)(2)))/2,
B = (2*Ks*w1*(-1 + y)*(1 - y + Yfed) +                                                           (1-4)
 +  Kw*(-2*w1 + 2*p*q*w1 + 2*q*w2 - 2*q*w1*Xfed + 7*w1*y - 4*p*q*w1*y -
   -   2*q*w2*y + 2*q*w1*Xfed*y - 5*w1*y(2) + w1*(-5 + 4*p*q + 5*y)*Yfed) +
   +  Im*(-2*g*v4*(-1 + y) +
+ v3* (-2 + 2*g*π - 2*g*Xfed + 7*y - 4*g*π*y + 2*g*Xfed*y - 5*y(2) +
        +  (-5 + 4*g*π + 5*y)*Yfed)))/(2*(-1 + y)),
A  =  0.5 [g*(Im*v3*(-2 + 3*y - 3*Yfed) + Ks*w1*(y - Yfed)) +                  (1-5)
       + Kw*q*w1*(-2 + 3*y - 3*Yfed)] .
In the next subsection we shall discuss optimization of the obtained objective
function w.r.t. (x,y), supposing fixed (s,t)≤ (1,1). The corresponding Lagrangian will be:
                              L(x,y, l1, l2, m3, m4) =                                                            (1-6)
=  w1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y)) + w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks) +
                     +  v3 Im RI(xs,yt) + v4 Im I(xs,yt ) +
+ l1(xs-Xmin) – l2(x-Xmax)+ m3 (yt-Ymin) – m4(y-Ymax)+ ρ (Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y) -
G),
where (l1, l2, m3, m4 , ρ ) ≥ 0  are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints.
Remark about stable-capital (equilibrium-point) optimization setting:
Above we have compared dynamics of old and new capital. But there can be an alternative setting,
based only on new capital, totally neglecting short-term considerations connected with existing capital
stock.  Suppose, that the decision-maker have in mind only to place sometimes in far future the region into a
stable situation (equilibrium), where the taxation policy and all variables are stable for a long period. We
should assume  (x,y) = (xs,yt) = (xI,yI), since tax rates and tax relieves promised to investors will actually
operate always  (recall, we convert also tax holidays into present-value-equivalent tax relieves).
Stability means, that annual gross investments exactly outweigh the annual depreciation (denoted a>0),
so that capital  K would remain the same annually: K=I/(1-a). We again suppose, that we have stable
investment curve parameters  Im,g,CI,π.  They should be supposed equal to parameters   Km/(1-a),g,CK,π K
of  “strong capital” curve, which should be supposed to be a triangle, not trapeze, in this setting.
So, we come to somewhat different then earlier 2-tax stable-dynamic (in essence pseudo- static)
optimization problem; subject to constraint  Im/ (1-a)* RI(x,y)  ≥  G, we should
optimize the function:
U(x,y) = ∑t=0Tδ (t)[ w1(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RI(x,y)) + w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks I(x,y )) +
                     + w1 Im RI(x,y) + w2 Im I(x,y ) ],      that is the same as to optimize
U(x,y) = w1(d Im/ (1-a)*RKw(x,y)+ Im/ (1-a)* RI(x,y)) + w2(d Im/ (1-a)* Kw(x,y)+
+ Im/ (1-a)* I(x,y )) + w1 Im RI(x,y) + w2 Im I(x,y ),
(we have used here parameter  0< d <1, describing regular share of “weak” operating capital to strong
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capital). One can see no principal difference from static problem in this setting.
In general, we suppose this “equilibrium” reasoning to be less characteristic for impatient Russian
decision-makers, then the previous approach, so we do not use it further.
1.6. Analytical and numerical study of optimization problem
For our stable-dynamic (pseudo-static) 2-tax optimization problem we have
constructed the Lagrangian with primal variables (x,y), dual variables (ρ , li , mi ), and
fixed parameters (s,t)≤ (1,1). We can reformulate it now dropping unimportant constants
and installing expressions as:
                            L(x,y, ρ, l1, l2, m3, m4) =                                                           (1-7)
= (w1+ ρ)(Kw RKw(x,y)+ Ks RKs(x,y)) + w2(Kw Kw(x,y)+ Ks) +
                     +
  v3 Im RI(xs,yt) + v4 Im I(xs,yt ) +  l1 xs - l2 x + m3  yt - m4 y =
= (w1+ρ )*(x- Xfed)Ks+(w1+ρ )*(y-Yfed)Ks *1/2(π-x+1/g)(1-g π-g x)+
       + (w1+ ρ )*(y- Yfed)(Ks CI+Kw CK)+
+Kw(1- q p-q x -y+q y x)/(1-y)* ((w1+ρ )*(x- Xfed+
+ (y-Yfed)*((1/2+1/2 (1-q p-q x -y+q y x)/(1-y) –q x )/q))+ w2)+w2 Ks +
+Im(1- g π -g xs -yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt)* ( v3(xs- Xfed+(yt-Yfed)*((1/2+
+1/2 (1-g π -g xs -yt+g yt xs)/(1-yt) –g xs )/g)) +v4)+v3*(yt- Yfed)Im CI +
+  l1 x s - l2 x + m3  y t - m4 y .
Remark for special (static) case: For the case when tax holidays are possible, the problem, as shown
above, split into 2 separate problems. The second one, i.e. optimizing (s,t) for fixed (x,y) is equivalent to
optimizing (x,y) under assumption (s,t) = (1,1) and ((w1+ ρ),w2) being infinitely smaller then (v3,v4), that
means that only future goals matter. Then we come to much simpler Lagrangian with similar properties:
                                L2(x,y, l1, l2, m3, m4) =
=  Imax(1- g π-g x -y+g y x)/(1-y)* ( v3*(x- Xfed+(y-Yfed)*((0.5+
                    +0.5(1-g π-g x -y+g y x)/(1-y) –g x )/g))+v4) + (l1  - l2 )x+ (m3  - m4) y.
General Lagrangian function, and simplified one, and function U(x,y), all appear to be
rational functions with 3-order polynomial in the nominator (with second order w.r.t.  x),
and with linear denominator. The first-order conditions (gained by computer) are (let (s,t)
= (1,1) , v1:= (w1+ρ )  further):
DxL= (2*Ks* v1*(-1 + y)*(1 - y + g*x*y + Yfed - g*x*Yfed) +
    +Kw* v1 (-2  + 2*p*q + 2*q*w2/(w1+ρ ) + 4*q* x - 2*q *Xfed + 7 *y -
       -4*p*q *y - 2*q*w2*y/(w1+ρ ) - 10*q *x*y + 2*q *Xfed*y - 5 *y(2) +
       +6*q* x*y(2) + (-5 + 4*p*q + 6*q*x + 5*y - 6*q*x*y)*Yfed) +
   + Im*(-2*g*v4*(-1 + y) +
+ v3* (-2 + 2*g*π + 4*g*x - 2*g*Xfed + 7*y - 4*g*π*y - 10*g*x*y +
         + 2*g*Xfed*y - 5*y(2) + 6*g*x*y(2) +
        +  (-5 + 4*g*π + 6*g*x + 5*y - 6*g*x*y)*Yfed)))/(2*(-1 + y)) +(l1 -l2) = 0
DyL= (Ks*q* v1*(-1 + y)(3) - g(2)*Ks*q* v 1*(π - x)*(π + x)*(-1 + y)(3) +
     + g*(-2*Kw* v
 1 - 2*CI*Ks*q* v 1 - 2*CK*Kw*q*w1 + 3*Kw*p*q* v 1 -
      - Kw*p(2)*q(2)* v
 1 + 2*Kw*p*q(2)* v 2 + 2*Ks*q* v 1*x + 5*Kw*q* v 1*x -
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      - 2*Kw*p*q(2)* v
 1*x - 3*Kw*q(2)* v 1*x(2) - 2*Kw*p*q(2)* v 1*Xfed -
       – (-6*Kw* v
 1 - 6*CI*Ks*q* v 1 - 6*CK*Kw*q* v 1 + 3*Kw*p*q* v 1 +
       +  Kw*p(2)*q(2)* v
 1 + 2*Kw*p*q(2)*w2 + 6*Ks*q* v 1*x + 15*Kw*q* v 1*x -
        - 2*Kw*p*q(2)* v
 1*x - 9*Kw*q(2)* v 1*x(2) - 2*Kw*p*q(2)* v 1*Xfed)*y -
        - 3* v
 1*(2*(Kw + CI*Ks*q + CK*Kw*q) - (2*Ks + 5*Kw)*q*x +
       +  3*Kw*q(2)*x(2))*y(2) + v
 1* (2*(Kw + CI*Ks*q + CK*Kw*q) –
 - (2*Ks + 5*Kw)*q*x + 3*Kw*q(2)*x(2))*y(3) +
+ Kw*p*q* v
 1*(2*p*q - (-3 + 4*q*x)*(-1 + y))*Yfed) +
 +   Im*q*(-2*g(2)*π*v4*(-1 + y) +
 +   v3*(-2 - 2*CI*g + 3*g*π - g(2)*π(2) + 5*g*x - 2*g(2)*π*x -
  -  3*g(2)*x(2) - 2*g(2)*π*Xfed + 6*y + 6*CI*g*y - 3*g*π*y -
  -  g(2)*π(2)*y - 15*g*x*y + 2*g(2)*π*x*y + 9*g(2)*x(2)*y +
 +  2*g(2)*π*Xfed*y - 6*y(2) - 6*CI*g*y(2) + 15*g*x*y(2) -
  -  9*g(2)*x(2)*y(2) + 2*y(3) + 2*CI*g*y(3) - 5*g*x*y(3) + 3*g(2)*x(2)*y(3) +
 +   g*π*(3*(-1 + y) + 2*g*(π + 2*x - 2*x*y))*Yfed)))/  (2*g*q*(-1 + y)(3))+
  + (m3-m4) = 0.
  Generally speaking, we should solve now this system w.r.t. (x,y), finding the
solutions   Xopt(wi,p,li,mi,...),Yopt(wi,p,li,mi,...), and (l,m) that fit boundary constraints,
supplementary slackness constraints and concavity conditions. Thus we could determine15
the exact solution  (Xopt, Yopt) which is really a global maximum within the constrains.
The solution would stand for couple of optimal-tax functions  (Xopt,Yopt):R12→ R2;
depending upon all parameters  (Im, g, π, w1, w2, CI, Ks,Kw, CK, Yfed, Xfed,Ymin ,Ymax ,Xmin
,Xmax ).
   However, direct symbolic solving this rational system of 2 equations even without
additional constraints turns out to be impossible: too tedious, both for manual and for
machine calculations. We have used  Mathematica-3.0 software, supposing it to be the
most powerful of the kind, but it failed in symbolic and even in numeric solving the
system of equations. The point is that the objective function  U  has unpleasant form (see
plots in Appendix) being generally non-concave on  R+2, and even on [0,1]*[0,1].
However, when y is fixed, it has 1 maximum w.r.t. x (it is a parabola in this direction), for
“most natural” parameters. This maximum, combined with boundary conditions, will be
used below for one-tax game.
In another direction, varying  y  and fixing x on  [0,1], the objective function has 3
critical points and 1 discontinuity point  (y=1) , since it has always zigzag shape (see the
plots) in “y” direction. Fixing parameter x, we have found these points y1(x),y2(x),y3(x)
by exact computer solving the equation  DyL(y,x) =0. Only one of these 3 critical points
(the smallest “y”) is a local maximum fitting natural constraints  0≤ y< 1. Within these
constraints there is also local minimum around  y=0.95 (for realistic parameters), while
for larger y  the function increases infinitely until y=1. So, if we believe, that upper legal
bound on profit tax is always less then, say, 0.9 (in Russian law it is 0.35, but including
VAT it becomes near 0.60), then the objective function is concave in “y” direction on
                                                          
15
 By comparing roots of equations with other constraints, manipulating if necessary with dual variables l,
m, and checking concavity.
22
admissible zone. Yet the concavity along abscissa and along ordinate is necessary, but not
sufficient to guarantee concavity in general on the admissible part of R2. In contrast,
continuity on this zone is obvious, guaranteeing maxima.
To exclude several isolated maxima, we should establish general concavity or quasi-
concavity. It is a hard task, since formulae are huge, preventing exact operation.
However, they were used for numeric solving. Machine experiments with plotting
function U(x,y) showed, that general shape of this surface remains more or less the same
with respect to our numerous parameters, only the slope and peaks move. This is
confirmed by the type of rational function U(...,x,y) as described above (power 3 in the
nominator).
 We performed extensive numerical investigation of concavity, exhausting with rather
dense net of tests the whole domain of “realistic” exogenous parameters K,pi, g, q,... and
a lot of (x,y) combinations (see the report in Appendix). Function U(...,x,y) was found to
be concave on the realistic admissible area  [0,Xmax]*[Ymin,Ymax], at least we have not
found a counterexample. So, under reasonable parameters (in particular, when  y-Yfed <
2/3, d>0.1) we may suppose it concave with high probability. Hence, U(x,y)  as well as
L(x,y), may be expected to have single maximum with respect to both variables on this
narrow domain. It is worth noting that this result used value d= Kw / Ks =0.1, in contrast
with d=0 considered in subsection 2.2. This explains the difference: short-term revenue
objective function may be non-concave under 2.2.
Having understood the optimization problem structure, we tried to reveal character of
solutions, dependent on parameters. We have explored with computer several series of
numeric solutions to special case of our problem (using dyhotomia algorithm and random
algorithm), namely the case related to optimizing only tax holidays, that is taking
Ks=Kw=0 in our objective function. We tried to exhaust again the whole area of
admissible (“reasonable”) numerical values of parameters, with more or less dense net of
tests. The Appendix explains what we suppose empirically “reasonable” or “realistic”.
   Namely, we studied two packages of intervals: with “low” taxes, and with “high”
taxes.
The first is  0.05<pi<0.18, 0≤ w1≤ 1, 0.8≤ g≤ 3.2, 0=Xmin , Xmax =0.02, 0.13=Ymin,
Ymax =0.35, Yfed=0.13, chosen directly from the Russian law. The results may be
interesting for some other country, or for realizing the mathematical structure of the
problem itself.  However, for Russia we realized that other taxes, first of all VAT,
essentially influence the solutions. So, we roughly estimated, how much profit tax and
property tax is enough to have the same impact on hampering investment as the three
taxes altogether, plus secondary taxes (see Appendix).  This born a “high-tax” seria with
doubled tax parameters:  p=0.05, p=0.09, 0≤ w1≤ 1, 2.0≤ g≤ 4.0, 0.02=Xmin ≤x≤  Xmax
=0.04, 0.26=Ymin≤y≤ Ymax =0.70, Yfed=0.26   (we looked briefly also on a broader range of
parameters, with the same results, but less thoroughly).
 Low-tax series) Dividing the domain of each of the 3 parameters  p,w1,g into 10
intervals, we tried each of 1000 points. We were plotting our objective function  U on the
admissed rectangle, and the solutions  Xopt(yconst),Yopt2(xconst) to 2 separate equations
DLx(x,yconst) =0,  DLy(xconst,y) =0 . We plotted also 2-dimensional functions
U(Xopt(y),y),U(x,Yopt2(x)) related to (Xopt, Yopt) reply-functions, and 2-dimensional
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functions  U(xconst,y),U(x,yconst) related to the boundaries of our rectangle domain (where
x
const
,yconst were taken as boundary values  (0.0,0.02,0.13,0.35)). In addition we plotted
“general graphs” gathering critical points of preference-for revenue parameter w1, where
the taxation strategy switches from one-tax to two-tax form, these graphs are more
informative, and checked the optima by an heuristic optimizing program (see Appendix
for pictures and details).
   Results. Most tests of this seria (and of the next also) have shown only  boundary
solutions, never attaining optimum in interiority of the admissible rectangle ([0.0,0.02],
[0.13,0.35]). In Appendix “General graphs”  one can see, that with small preference for
revenue w1,  in all tests with “reasonable” parameters the property tax becomes positive
only when profit tax hits its upper limit, whatever it can be. Even if we allow property tax
to be negative by setting negative lower bound on it (like  -1,-10,-100), this bound is
reached in optimal solution, when we solve for (x,y) within 0< y< 1, since the U surface
is a usually sloped ascending to left far corner (see plots). So, usually a rational
legislator will chose profit tax Y until possible, and only constraints force him to use
property tax X. This common rule is violated in the region 0.12 < p,  3.5<g, 0.98<w1,
0.13 < p,  3.4< g, 0.97< w1, ..., 0.18< p,  2.4< g, 0.95< w1. However, only the last of these
6 exceptional graphs showing really interior maximums, as shown in another Appendix.
All these tests used unreasonably high profit pk and high revenue preference w1. So the
rule can be supposed mostly holding.
    High-tax series) Exactly the same rule was found for the series of tests with
parameters p=0.05, p=0.09, 0< w1< 1, 2.0< g< 4.0, 0.02=Xmin <x<  Xmax =0.04,
0.26=Ymin<y< Ymax =0.70, Yfed=0.26. Most expressive examples of this series see in
Appendix “Direct optimization”. Tests showed that, again, profit tax would be  preferred
when possible, except for narrow and unrealistic range of parameters, where property tax
prevails. For instance, Test 3: Xmin=0.00; Xmax=0.04; Ymin=0.40; Ymax=0.70; Xfed=0.005,
g=2.3; p=0.09; w1>0.90 (too small bound on property tax, too high preference for revenue
w1 and high alternative profit p). Test4 -  with  Xmin=0.00; Xmax=0.04; Ymin=0.40;
Ymax=0.70; Xfed=0.005; Yfed=0.26;   g=3.6; w1=0.96; - too high higher sensitivity factor;
this test is the lowest (g=3.6) to show non-trivial two-tax solutions, while with higher g
non-triviality also happens.
  In all tests, the natural dependencies are present:
- increasing slope g of the investment curve (sensitivity to taxes) always drives
down the optimal taxes;
- increasing preference for revenue w1 (as opposed to preference for
capital/employment) always drives taxes up;
 
Non-trivial findings are that:
- profit tax is usually preferred to property tax, being less harmful to investment for
the same amount of revenue, only legal bounds on profit tax may force usage of property
tax;
- this is not the case when alternative profit p, sensitivity factor g and preference
for revenue w1 are all “very high” – then composite taxes or even preference for property
tax become possible.
To close the section, note, that our scheme of analysis (but not the numerical results)
can be applied not only to capital market, but also to various markets with a linearized
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demand curve and with flat supply curve. Property tax is analogue of “unit tax”, while
profit tax is like “ad valorem tax”, their optimal mixture is found. However, formulae for
demand dependence upon taxes and for revenue are slightly different.
2. TAX COMPETITION GAME
We attempt to develop theoretical framework for arguing about possible outcomes of
the interregional tax competition in Russia, to distinguish and estimate main parameters
yielding divergence effect, that means increasing asymmetry of development. Another
question is the efficiency and welfare implications of divergence. The below models use
the estimates and ideas obtained in E.Kolomak’s empirical analysis, and the above tax-
optimization results.
2.1. General scheme of dynamic tax competition game
Relying on the above rational-behavior model, now we outline the dynamic agents-
interaction model.
Game concept. Slightly detailing the concept explained in the introduction, we
describe now tax competition in terms of infinite sequential game with 91 players: 89
regions, dummy player “capital market”, and dummy “consequences of temporary
equilibrium”. They act in turn. The regions simultaneously establish their tax rates, then
relying on these rates capital market equilibrate demand and supply for capital (in usual
Marshalian-cross manner), yielding equilibrium profit rate, then investments and all other
consequences including capital stock and tax revenues are calculated. Then the whole
play repeats. The regions are supposed to behave myopically, taking profit rate as given,
in this relation they are price-takers. So, if the process converges to some equilibrium, it
is a Nash equilibrium among 91 players. Investors, entrepreneurs – all are beyond the








Figure 2. Game sequence







We aim to show the mechanism of effects arising due to tax competition, namely
divergence and efficiency. Let us discuss expected performance of the outlined game,
including additional elements, like public goods, not investigated in present version.













 Figure 3:  The scheme explaining possible ``divergence effect”  in the taxation models. Positive
feedback circles are black, clock-directed. Negative feedback circles are white, anti-clock-directed. Shaded
are the elements skipped in this version of the model. Exogenous parameters are marked with “+” if their
large value enforce divergence, or “-“ in the opposite case.
 General scheme of possible regional- taxation models describing “divergence”
possibility see on Fig.3. It is the scheme of a process, born by the game discussed. Main
exogenous parameters are: alternative (outside this region) profit rate p, sensitivity-to-
taxes parameter g (slope of demand for capital), initial capital stock Ki, initial public
goods stock Gi, legal regulations of taxation sphere, expressed in admissible minimal and
maximal values of taxes x,y, in transfer parameters. Endogenous stock- variables are
squares, two of them include negative feedback: capital depreciation. These are
accumulated public goods volume G and accumulated capital volume K. Another stock-
type variable is the ``maximal-possible investment” parameter Im, describing investment
possibilities, which can be exhausted by investment, but restored and enhanced by public
goods volume (in the simplest version it is constant). There are 4 flow-variables. Taxation
revenue Rev, positively depends upon capital and upon transfer Tr from federal
government, which, in turn, increases when revenues are too low (in the simplest version
it is constant). Current investment volume I(x,y) positively depends upon property tax
relief x and profit tax relief y. The tax relives, in turn, positively depends upon good
budget position described by Rev, since it provides “slack”.
   All systems with positive feedback circles are apt to amplifying initial disturbances.
The question is, whether the negative feedback is sufficiently strong to hamper this
possibility.
   In our case the most strong positive circle is: tax relieves  -> more investment ->
more capital -> more revenue -> more possibility to grant tax relieves. Additional one
26
working in the same direction: more revenue -> more public goods -> better investment
opportunities -> more investment -> more capital -> more revenue. These positive circles
could drive two initially-different regions infinitely far from one another, if not for
hampering negative circles. Capital depreciation imposes limits on the growth of K and
G, exhausting of resources that can be used by capital (including labor, not presented
explicitly) imposes limits on investment and capital also. Federal transfers, being
dependent upon region’s financial weakness, works in the same direction.
 However, in the present study we have investigated only the amplifying contour
connected with budget constraint. We mentioned other dependencies to sketch the context
of ideas and general program of study. We see that generally prediction of divergence or
convergence of different regions crucially depends upon the exact character and strength
of the dependencies described. So the theoretical goal is to build logically reasonable
dependencies connecting taxes with exogenous parameters and other variables. And the
goal of empirical estimation is to provide reasonable exogenous parameters, under which
we could explore the solutions to the model. Alternatively, theoretical results can be in
the form of revealing threshold values of these parameters, sufficient to yield divergence
and efficiency.
This program was reasonably fulfilled only for one-tax version of our model. We start
with describing it, then we touch the version with two taxes.
2.2. Version of tax competition model with one tax (property tax). Analytical
results
In this subsection we shall consider a special case of our 2-tax model, with several
additional assumptions.
We shall suppose that only the property tax can be optimized, while other taxes are
fixed. We shall suppose specific values of some constants also: p=CI=CK=0,
Xmin=Xfed=0.02, Ymin=Yfed=0.35, d=0, Kw=0.
These simplifications are not too realistic, but help in analytic results.16
Accordingly, our optimization problem of r-th region becomes simpler now, with
fixed  y= Y= const > Yfed:
   Arxr(2)+Brxr  –> maxx  ,  subject to  a rxr (2)+b rxr+ h r  ≥ Gr , Xmin ≤  xr  ≤ Xmax,
while for the case when the constraints are incompatible due to large Gr, this




 rxr - h r
+Gr] (see more comments below). Here r<90,  G, as previously, means necessary
spendings, constants A, B, H, and short-term constants a, b, h, were expressed in initial
                                                          
16
 We shall mention even more special case with profit tax y=0, that one can interpret in the
following way: profit tax and other profit-like taxes to be included into the investment curve, thus the
“profit” of the curve will mean not gross profit in this section, but rather “gross profit minus profit-tax”.
Then investment triangle diminishes. This simplification biases the tax incidence, of cause, but allow for
direct model solutions.
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terms earlier (1-3) –(1-5). With new simplifying assumptions they become (we drop
index r when we not need it):
a= (g*Ks* (y - Yfed))/2 >0 ; b = Ks* (1 - y + Yfed) >0;






 = Ks* (x - Xfed) + (Ks* (1/g + π - x)*(1 - g*π - g*x)*(y - Yfed))/2
increases on  R+  infinitely, it has minimum at some  x<0. Hence, when budget constraint
is binding, it relates to positive-sign root of the equation  a
 rxr
 (2)+b
 rxr+ h r  =Gr , that is
x
s(Ks,pi) = 0.5(-b + Re[(b(2) – 4 a (h – G))(0.5)])/ a, where Re[.] denotes real part of
the number.  Obviously, function xs(.,.) depending upon (Ks, pi) is continuous.
Further, to understand type of solutions, note that
A=  3 Ks*w1* (g*(Im*v3*(-2/3 + y - Yfed)/ Ks*w1 + (y - Yfed)))/2;
B= (2*Ks*w1*(y -1)*(1 - y + Yfed) +  Im*(-2*g*v4*(y -1) +
  +v3* (-2 - 0.04*g + 2*g*π + 7*y + 0.04*g*y - 4*g*π*y - 5*y(2) - 5*Yfed +
         + 4*g*π*Yfed + 5*y*Yfed)))/(2*(y -1)).
We shall assume further, that the first parabola has maximum, while the second one
increases for all x>0, that can be expressed as:
      1)     Ar<0,    2) a r > 0, b> 0.
It is important to note here, that there is a realistic domain of parameters for which
the three properties hold. Condition “2)” is weaker then [0< y-Yfed], that is quite realistic.
Conditions “1)” under assumed positive Ks*w1, g, Im, becomes
Im*v3/ Ks*w1= Imax*Ccoeff  / Ks  >  (y - Yfed)/( Yfed + 2/3 -y).
When Yfed=0.35, 0.35<y<60,  then right-hand side of this relation is between,
roughly, 0 and 1, while left-hand side for reasonable relation investment/capital like Imax=
Ks/10, and reasonable factor Ccoeff =10, is close to 1.
Thus our optimization problem becomes a convex optimization problem:
 Arxr(2)+Brxr  –> maxx  ,  subject to   xr  ≤  xsr (Ksr,pi) , Xmin ≤  xr  ≤ Xmax,
The above restrictions on parameters are maintained throughout this one-tax
subsection. In particular, they guarantee continuity of solution to optimization problem.
Maximizing our criterion function (in a given period t) w.r.t. xrt  yields either the
short-term-optimal solution xrt s(Ksr,pi), when budget constraint is binding, or the
unconstrained long-term-optimal solution xrt*, that will be formulated as:
xrt
*(πt-1, Kr,t-1) =max {Xmin, min{Xmax,  - 0.5 Brt-1 / Art-1 }.
Constrained maximum xrt(πt-1, Kr,t-1) relates to constrained long-term Laffer curve
solution. This optimal tax choice within budget constraint, may be explained as follows.
Exogenous parameters given, for some regions the critical point  xsr t  that cover necessary
expenditures may happen to be less than x*r t  — they will choose an optimum long-term
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rate of tax x*r t  .  The regions with a critical point between x* and Xma x  will choose this
second-best point xs r t , and other will be compelled to leave the tax rate on the upper legal
bound Xma x ,  not having an opportunity to reduce the current incomes for the sake of the
future.17 So, summarizing assumptions on behavior of regions, we can formulate the
following continuous, piecewise- smooth function  describing response of a given region
to the changing factors in year t:
       x rt(πt-1, Kr,t-1) :=  max{Xmin,  xsr (πt-1, Kr,t-1),  xr t*(πt-1, Kr,t-1)} =
        =  max{Xmin,  xsr (πt-1, Kr,t-1),   min{Xmax,  - 0.5 B(πt-1, Kr,t-1) / A(πt-1, Kr,t-1) }}   (1)
As soon as functions xsr (πt-1, Kr,t-1), B(πt-1, Kr,t-1) ,  A(πt-1, Kr,t-1)<0 are continuous, this
response function is continuos too on the admissible domain (it can be revealed
substituting the expressions for A(…), B(…) into formula (1)). Obviously, the solution
xrt always lies within constraints [Xmin, Xmax], but it may be not the case for budget
constraint. In this case we shall also suppose formula (1) to reflect the reply-function of
the region, instead of saying that there is no reply (no admissible plan). It reflects the
hypothesis, that the region will do something in any case, even if it can not cover
necessary expenses; either it borrows, or reduces its needs. The formula relates to
minimizing the debt in this case.
Time recursion.
Competition starts with taxes xsr = Xmax, and some initial accumulated capital Ksr0.
The depreciation coefficient being α<1, new capital will be
  Krt=Kr , t– 1*α +Ir t  .
In all periods besides the first, we shall assume that the regions choose the tax rate in
a Nash-type fashion, expecting preservation of existing rate of net profit. They ignore
strategic consequences of their decision, influencing the whole country.
Afterwards, capital market works, where capital supply is supposed linear, that is
I0(π t) = I0  -  βπ ,  and equilibrium profit rate π“t  clears the market of capital:
I0(π“t) =∑rIr t(π“t ,  xrt),
that entails equation (3).
                                                          
17
 We ignore a question of financing those, for whom the maximum current sum lies below critical
point, they are supposed to beg from the federal budget or borrow somehow. Actually, for the ``necessary”
state expenditures Gr  we take a "critical" sum below which situation is considered dangerous by the head of
the region.
29
  Io(π  )=  o+ β π
 π
 I
 π  “
 I”  I(π )
Figure 5. A curve of investments supply Io(π)  crossed with the total investment
demand curve I (p), gives the equilibrium rate of net profit  π“.
Thus, we determine behavior of the game participants in each period by the following
recursive system of formulae:
xrt= xrt(πt-1, Kr,t-1)         ∀ r                                     
(2)
πt= πt(xt) = ∑r (I rt - gr xrt - I0)/ (β+∑r gr)                
(3)
Irt= Irt( πt,  xrt) =  Imaxr*(1-gπt -g xrt -y+gy xrt)/(1-y)       ∀ r                  (4)
Krt= Krt(Kr,t-1, Irt) =α Kr,t-1+Irt         ∀ r                   
(5)
Yrt=Yrt(xrt, Krt) = xrt Krt         ∀ r.                             
(6)
The last equation reflects the tax revenues Yrt , it is inessential for the first 5.
Obviously, given the magnitudes of the last period, the system of equations (1) –(5) w.r.t.
variables bundle ft= (xt ,π t ,It ,Kt) can be solved consistently, in the sequence from (1) to
(5), and the solution is unique. So, we shall view this system as a vector function
F:RlRl ,  with   l:=3m+1 arguments, defined as:
F(π ,x ,I ,K):= (π(x), x(π ,K), I(π ,x), K(Kr , t– 1,I))
Definition.  An infinite sequence bundle (π t ,  xrt ,Ir t ,Krtr≤m) t=1∞ satisfying the
equations  (1) – (5) will be named a path of the described economy.  A bundle  f” =
(  π”,  x”,  I”,  K” ) = (π”t ,   x”r t ,  I”r t ,  K”r t ,  r≤m) ,  for some moment t,  will be named
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a stationary point (equilibrium),  if it is mapped by system F( ·) of formulas (1) –(5) into
itself, so that  F(f”) = f”
By definition, the equilibrium  f”  should satisfy the following system of equations:
x”r= x r (I” , K”),             ∀ r                         (7)
π” = ∑r (I r  - gr x”r -  I0)/ (β+∑r gr)              (8)
I”r =  Imaxr *(1-g π”  -g x”r -y+gy x”r)/(1-y)       ∀ r                                (9)
K”rt  = α K”r +  I”rt            ∀ r                      (10)
Under our assumptions (that seem “realistic”) we have existence theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists a stationary point (equilibrium) of the above model with one
tax.18
Proof.  We rely on continuity on the reply function x , explained above. Continuity of
other functions forming recursive single-valued function F(.) can be seen in (7) –(10). So,
to apply Kakutani fixed-point theorem to F( ·) we need only compactness and convexity
of its domain. According to (1), (2) the domain and the range of values for x   is the m-
dimensional closed cube [Xmin ,  Xma x]m . Accordingly (see (3)) the domain and the range
of values for π   is this cube’s image π([Xmi n ,  Xma x]m). By linearity of the function
π(.),   it is also a closed cube. Similarly, by definition, the domain and the range of each
Ir ,  is also closed interval [0, Imaxr], for all r.  Let us take upper bound for capital
variables K1,…,Km their values defined by formula (5) or (10) with maximal possible
investment: Kr = Imaxr /(1-a), then domain for capital is Kr∈ [0, Imaxr /(1-a)]. It is obvious
that capital for all admissible x,I,π  can not take values out of this cube, if the initial
capital was inside the cube.
So,  Ft( ·) displays a convex compact domain into itself,  Ft( ·) is a continuous
function,  therefore Kakutani’s theorem is applicable, that suffices for the proof.
Consider the case, when tax competition is going one-way, i.e. regions are allowed
only to reduce taxes starting from some common level Xmax (to grant tax relieves), but not
to increase taxes. If in addition, somebody use this opportunity, then, obviously, there will
be more investment. If somebody does not use it, he is worse off. More accurately,
consider
Theorem 2. (one-way competition)19 Assume that single-tax economy (1) –(5) has an
equilibrium (stationary point)  f” = (  π”,  x”,  I”,  K” ) where at least one region i does
                                                          
18
 There can be multiple equilibria, as shown by examples.
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use its right to grant tax relieves, that is ∃i: x”i<Xmax. Then this equilibrium differs from
the unique equilibrium f’ = (π’,  x’,  I’,  K’ ) that could be achieved without tax
competition (assumption  xr  ≡  Xmax,∀r) in the following features:
(i: development efficiency) At point  f” a larger equilibrium profit level is achieved:
π” > π’, and a larger total investment level I” in the country, then the level I’ achieved
without competition.
(ii: divergence) If at point  f” there is a region j ,  not using its right for tax
relieves: ∃j: x”j =Xmax,  then development asymmetry of regions is stronger under
competition, in the sense that each region j without tax relieves has less capital, than
without competition (K” j <K’j), while at least one region using tax relieves have more
investment and capital: ∃i: ( x”i<Xmax,  K” i >K’i).
The proof.
Item (i). We notice, that when tax rates xr=Xma x  are fixed, then the (equilibrium)
solution to the system (7) - (12) is unique w.r.t. other variables, since the system is linear.
On the contrary, the system has, generally speaking, several solutions when the tax rates
xr  are free to go down.  Assumptions given, some of these equilibrium values  xr  (∃r)
will appear to be below, than Xma x . By substituting the sum  ∑ ix  i  of these magnitudes
into the equality (8), we have the greater profit magnitude π(x)>π(Xma x) than for fixed
tax rates  Xma x  .The larger profit means the larger investments according to  (11), that
suffices for (i).
Item (ii). Rely on larger profit rate π(x)>π(Xma x), use the assumption about
existence of "critically poor region"  r  such, that its tax is xr=  Xma x  ,  then, according to
equation (9), this region is worse off at point  f”  in comparison with equilibrium without
competition, where rate of profit was less. On the other hand, the sum of the investments
has increased (I”>I’), hence there is at least one region winning capital, that proves (ii).
Equilibria multiplicity and different patterns of divergence and traps. Paths of the
described model have been simulated on the computer, with the program in Mathematica-
3.0 language, for numerous examples (see section 2.3. for algorithm and Appendix for
results).
Simulations have shown, that there are multiple possible equilibria under the same
exogenous conditions: fixed capital curve parameters g,q and budgets Gr (actually we
normalized starting capital and Gr of regions dividing by Gr, normalization does not
affect the optimization), weights w1,w2,δ of different goals. Varying only initial capital
K1,...,Km we can see finitely many different equilibria. Moreover, quite similar regions
(with the same technology and goals) are winning or losing competition, dependent on
initial capital (low-budget divergence). Alternatively, similar regions may become
                                                                                                                                                                            
19
 This one-way theorem can be reversed. Suppose the opposite: that competition starts from the lowest
possible level Xmin, and regions have right to only increase taxes. Then development inefficiency will take
place, by the same logic as efficiency in first variant. Besides, divergence can also take place, that depends
upon the role of budget constraint. We do not touch this more, as this direction of competition is not
observed in Russia.
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winners or losers dependent on the weight of investments in their criterion function
(impatience-driven divergence). These two are the most interesting patterns of
divergence.
  In explored examples, there was always a bifurcation point K0  in terms of starting
capital, such that all regions starting above this point converges into one “winners” group
(asymptoteof paths), while all “critically poor” regions (whose budget constraint does not
allow them to reduce taxes) – converges into separate group of “losers” (see Appendix).
Divergence was absent, naturally, in those tests, where all tested regions happened to be
initially above bifurcation point K0 (all are rich enough to start competition), or below it
(all are critically poor). Thus, equilibrium pattern is predetermined not only by technology
and goals, but by initial state also, and low initial capital may become a “trap”.
We went half-way to identify conditions, providing traps existence necessarily.
To do this, let us express volume of capital, sufficient to cover budget needs G, if




 rxr+ h r =Gr.    Substituting here expressions for a r ,b r , h r and solving for
Ks  we obtain the needed critical value of capital:
Ks(critic)(G,g,pi,y) = (2.*g*G)/(y - 1.*Yfed + g*(-2.*Xfed +
   + g*Xmax(2)*(y - 1.*Yfed)+
 + g*π(2)*(-1.*y + 1.*Yfed) +    Xmax*(2. - 2.*y + 2.*Yfed))) =
= (2.*g*G)/(-0.35 +  g*(0.068 + g*(-0.00056 + pi(2)*(0.35 - 1.*y) +
+ 0.0016*y) – 0.08*y) + y) =
=  22.19 G.
Here we have installed the supposed in this section values   Xmin=Xfed=0.02,
Ymin=Yfed=0.35, and on final evaluation installed sample “realistic” values  π = 0.05; g=3.,
y = 0.55, to realize the order of numbers. It can be seen, that for realistic values Ks(critic)>0.
It is the main thing for bifurcation point to exist.
Like above, we denote by f’ = (  π’,  x’ ,  I’,  K’  ) the equilibrium without competition
f’, in formulating the below sketch of proposition (or remark). Let us denote also  fh =
(  πh,  xh,  Ih,  Kh ) the specific “high-capital” equilibrium (attractor) that would occur if
abolishing budget constraints, that is setting Gr=0  for all r.
Remark 1 (Hypothetical: existence of low-budget trap) Consider an economy (1) –(5)
with two regions20 with all parameters of the regions identical and fixed, but for initial
capital variables (K1,K2)∈R2+ that can vary. Assume such parameters of the regions that
their long-term maximum is below upper bound:
 xr
*( π’, Kr,t-1) =maxXmin,   - 0.5 Brt-1 / Art-1 <Xmax ,
and critical-capital point lies between low asymptoteand high attractor:
                      K’r  < Ks(critic)(G,g, π’,y) < Kh r ., r=1,2.
Then critical-capital point K0 = Ks(critic)(G,g, π’,y) is a bifurcation point, i.e. all starting
capital couples (K1,K2) such that [K1 < K0 < K2] - provides different final (equilibrium)
states of capital  K1” <   K2”  of these identical regions 1,2.
                                                          
20
 We are sure in possibility of expanding this assertion to several regions case, but its formulation becomes
unnecessary tedious, since the position of bifurcation point depends upon all parameters and initial states of
all regions.
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We have not proved this hypothetical remark yet, it may happen that additional
assumptions will be needed.
Fiscal efficiency of competition in general. Now consider the theoretically possible
(not Russian) case, when tax competition can go two-way, i.e. regions are allowed both to
reduce and to increase taxes x∈ [Xmin,Xmax], (theorem is valid for any [Xmin,Xmax],
including [0,∞]) starting from some common level xr= Xstart, for all r. Then we shall see
“administrative” or fiscal efficiency of  competition. This effect is very general, not
depending upon special assumptions, that seems strange at first glance. However, in
essence it is very natural, when we compare this taxation game with monopolistic price
discrimination, or with classical market, as we do in the below sketch of the proof of the
below theorem, that is not proved in detail yet.
Theorem 3.(Hypothetic . Efficiency of competition.)
Suppose an equilibrium f” with free competition, where all regions have their
“budget constraints” not binding (revenues exceed Gr for all r). Then:
i) Equilibrium f” is Pareto-efficient in terms of objectives of m regional
administrations, i.e. there is no other f’ satisfying demand and supply constraints (8) –(10)
that Pareto dominates f”.(administrative efficiency)21
ii) Assume that each region has only (long- and/or short-term) revenue objective (that
is w2=0). Then equilibrium f”gives not less total tax revenue then any equilibrium f’ with
uniform taxing all regions (for any uniform tax rate Xstart), and this inequality is strict
(“>”) if at least one region r has voluntarily chosen non-uniform tax xr≠ Xstart (fiscal
efficiency).
iii) Assume again that each region has only (long- and/or short-term) revenue
objective (that is w2=0). Compare equilibrium f” with equilibrium f’ with uniform taxing
all regions, having fiscal- optimal  uniform tax rate Xstart, that is one giving maximal total
tax revenue. If equilibrium f”does not coincide with f’ in tax rates, and all capital markets
are open in f’ (i.e. I1>0,I2>0,…,Im>0) then f” yields larger welfare loss then f’, in terms of
consumer and producer surplus, and gains of the state. (welfare inefficiency, compared to
optimal uniform tax, competition irrelevant for development efficiency).
Sketch of the proof.
i) Indeed, we can look at taxation game as on buying some commodity – capital from
a producer described by capital supply curve. Regions buy capital (paying by obligations
of future return) and resell it to their local markets of capital (described by capital demand
curves). In reality, of course, they only impose trade margins (here - taxes), but it makes
no difference for the equilibrium. Regional authorities in relation to their local demands
are monopolists, but in relation to producer they are like consumers, whose utility of two
commodities: capital and obligations - depends upon their local markets for capital,
                                                          
21
 This (i) assertion, though placed within linear-demand one-tax context, in principal is much more general,
most of assumption maintained in this subsection are not essential for it as one can see from the scetch of
the proof.
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where they hold monopoly. These utilities may be expressed in money, or not, it does not
matter. They may include tax revenue and development goals. The only thing that matter
for applying 1-st Welfare Theorem to this general equilibrium on perfect market (between
the producer and these pseudo-consumers) is that the objective functions should be
unsatiable. They are. So, we have Welfare Theorem’s assertion: any equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient in terms of consumers (here - regional authorities) objectives, i.e.
administrative efficiency.  If these objectives consist only in tax revenues, then we have
fiscal efficiency as such, otherwise we have more general pleasant feature. Important in
this reasoning is that “budget constraint” G, should play no role in this trade, having
another budget constraint. Otherwise it is not a classical market, and no Welfare
Theorems can be applied.
ii) Exploiting our capital market linearity, we can use two ways of reasoning. One
way is as follows. Investment volume Ir of a region is the demand for capital volume,
linearly dependent upon its price π and upon tax x. If setting zero values for simplicity to
most unessential constants, it will be: I(π ,x) = Imax (1- g π − g x). Meanwhile optimal tax
rate x*= - 0.5 B/A  = S – T π  is also linear in π  , where S,T are some constants, revealed
from the huge formulae of optimization section. Then in general the r-th regional demand
for capital, biased by optimal taxation, behaves like I(π ,x) = Imax (1- g π − g (S – T π )),
that is also linear in price π.
We know from classical microeconomics that for linear market representative
consumer can be found, whose utility function generates this demand. Moreover, this
pseudo-consumer has quasi-linear utility function, that allows finding Pareto-optima just
through maximizing sum of their utilities. Then, by (i) assertion, general equilibrium f”
maximizes sum of tax revenues w.r.t. x1,x2,…xm.
On the other hand, maximizing sum of tax revenues by imaginary decision-maker,
choosing uniform tax rate x for all regions can not give more then the same task without
uniformity constraint. It gives strictly less, when the results do not coincide, since the
quadratic objective function is strictly concave.
Another way of proving the same, and item (iii) together, is to apply
Robinson-Schmalenzi theorem about monopolistic discrimination. Indeed, when
maximizes sum of tax revenues w.r.t. x1,x2,…xm, we solve, in essence, “submarket
discrimination” monopolist’s problem. If not coinciding with uniform-price solution, it
gives strictly more profit to monopolist (that is more tax revenue in our context). The
only thing, that we should realize for the proof is that maximizing their profits (tax
revenues) individually, profit rate given (it is analogue of costs for them), the regions will
choose exactly the same tax levels as the imaginary common decision-maker. For the case
of flat capital-supply curve (analogue of constant marginal costs) it is obvious. But it is
easy to see, that is the case also for all non-decreasing supply curves. This proves (ii).
    Consider (iii). By Robinson-Schmalenzi theorem the total equilibrium demand on
all markets  is the same under discrimination and without it (if no one market closes), and
welfare loss is larger with discrimination, if they do not coincide. Q.E.D.
2.2.2. Tax competition without traps and divergence: discrimination between old and
new capital, or no budget constraint
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We have described above the effect of divergence due to low-budget trap occurring
for some region(s). However,  divergence may be absent, when regions are able to
discriminate between old and new capital, say granting holidays to investment, and fully
taxing existing business (that is common in Russia now).
Remark 2. (no traps when there are holidays)  Suppose no constraints on variables
(s,t), that can be less or more then (1,1), i.e. tax holidays are available. Then there is no
low-budget-traps and no related divergence effect: technologically identical regions with
identical objectives always have the same stationary investment levels I”, independently
of initial state of capital.
Proof. Indeed, we have shown in optimization section that the 4-tax optimization
problem can be split into 2 separate problems when there is no constraint (s,t) = (1,1), i.e.
tax holidays are available. Then such region may grant optimal tax relieves or tax
holidays to investors, paying no current price for this future benefit, that is ignoring
budget constraint. So, it chooses long-term optimal strategy (s,t), after choosing some
(x,y). According to the linear equilibrium relations (7) –(10), this result in similar I” for
all technologically-similar regions. So, no low-budget-born divergence and no tarps
occur.
Naturally, the same no-trap effect occurs, when we just do not include budget
constraint into the model.
However, touching the relation of our models to reality, we can note that including
into them such details as developing public goods, can well born traps, like budget
constraint do (see the “amplifying contour” explanation, attached to Fig.3.).
2.3. Competition model with two taxes, computer simulations
Now consider more general model, then the one described in previous subsection,
model with 2 taxes: property tax and profit tax (the latter was just fixed in numerical tests
related to previous subsection, so this general model covers 1-tax and 2-tax cases, with or
without tax holidays). It was designed for numerical and analytical study of qualitative
features of tax competition process, and realized as a Mathematica-3.0 program. Let us
give more detailed description of the game sequence, i.e. the computation algorithm22 (see
also Fig.2).
    There are many players: m regions r=1,...,m, choosing in each period variables xr,yr
– property and profit tax rates; sr,tr – tax relieves (index of time period dropped here),
taking existing alternative profit p as given, together with other parameters including K,Im
(explained below); one capital market choosing profit rate p, given the taxation strategies
(x,y, s,t), and one dummy player “functional dependence”, determining subsequent
variables Ir ,Kr . In each period, after variables (x,y, s,t, p) are settled, we determine
investment volume Ir(xr,yr, sr,tr, p) in each region, subsequent capital Kr(.), dependent
also on accumulated capital and on fixed depreciation rate, subsequent tax revenues
                                                          
22
 Some details of this general model, like public goods and federal transfers, though implemented in the
algorithm, were skipped in the present series of testing the model, so not mentioned here.
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 Rr(xr,yr,sr,tr,Kr).
   Exogenous parameter Gr describes “necessary” spendings. When a region have
deficit, then the current objective function U(.) of the region changes in the direction of
increasing preference weight w1  for current revenue, so much as to achieve balance
Rr(xr,yr,sr,tr,Kr) = Gr (increasing impatience).
This decision sequence repeats one period after another, starting from maximal tax
rates Xmax, Ymax and initial capitals K1,..., Km. In all tests it converged to some equilibria
(stationary states).
 Analytical study of this model was not completed, being extremely tedious.
Theorem guaranteeing the equilibria existence seem impossible without specific
assumptions on parameters. Indeed, as shown in the “optimization” section and  in
Appendix, the functions optimized by the regions are generally non-concave on
[0,1]*[0,1]. However, inexistence of equilibria in reality is hardly possible.
 We started to study divergence and its welfare consequences on this general model.
However, this study is hard to implement analytically, since even the reply functions have
no analytical form (only algorithmical one).
Therefore, we simulated paths of the described model with two taxes on the
computer, as well as for simpler one-tax model. The results showing divergence and traps
of various nature are quite the same.
Conclusion
Study of optimal taxing several capital markets with immobile capital demand by
single legislator have shown that:
1. Tax-discrimination policy, if ideally accomplished, can abandon Lafferian
tradeoff between tax revenues and economic development, it enables to combine
both on maximal level, that is Pareto-efficient (though in a broader context, it could
hamper effective capital flows). It should be recommended when possible, if not for
corruption.
2. We studied objective function combining linearly production goal and tax-
revenue goal, depending upon two taxes: profit tax and property tax. Under the most
realistic values of parameters, this function is concave on the narrow “ realistic”
domain, and its maximum is almost always lying on the border, giving preference to
profit tax against property tax, while for arbitrary parameters both statements are
false, in particular, property tax is preferred for “very high” sensitivity of business to
taxes (we ignored corruption and tax evasion cases, when property tax may have
additional benefits).
3. Reaction of optimal taxation pattern to the exogenous parameters is as follows.
Higher preference for revenue against development (employment), as well as lower
sensitivity of investment to taxes, yield, naturally, higher taxes. However, only high
sensitivity combined with unnaturally high preference for revenue (impatience)
provides property tax becoming prefered to profit tax.
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Study of game-theoretical tax competition model has shown, under the specified
assumptions, that the competition has following consequences for efficiency and regional
asymmetry.
 The stationary point of the economy (the equilibrium) with tax competition
differs from an equilibrium without tax competition by the following features.
1. When region’s short-term “budget constraint” does not play active role (that is the
case, in particular, when tax holidays are practiced), administrative efficiency is
achieved, i.e. goals of regional administrations achieved in equilibrium can not be
Pareto-improved. This implies fiscal efficiency, i.e. maximal total country’s tax
revenue – in special case when administrative goals consist only in long-term budget
revenues, and when capital demands are linear. Development efficiency of
competition in the latter case appears if and only if initial uniform tax rate was not
optimal. Welfare efficiency (total consumer’s and producer’s surplus, plus tax
revenues), on the contrary, may be enhanced or deteriorated by competition,
depending upon initial state: if initial state was optimal and all markets functioned,
then competition makes losses.
2. Take the case when region’s short-term “budget constraint” does play active role
only for some poor regions (suppose no tax holidays, demand linearity, and other
restrictions), while tax competition goes one-way, starting from the highest
admissible level of tax downwards. Then development efficiency of competition is
present, together with divergence (increasing asymmetry), and with usual presence of
low-budget traps, that is isolated low-capital equilibria for some or all regions,
which can be avoided if having more initial capital.
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APPENDICES
Appendix  A1:  Data: investment curves, their linearization
Initial data (investment projects, declared by big investors to regional administrations to get support):











21.9 0.08 14.988 1.9 116.3 2 128 1 8.9 1.9
1 1 19.96 2 39.3 2 483.6 1 0.27 2.5
0.5 1 37.884 2 30 2 1723.7 2 0.3922 3
0.7 1 18.538 2 20 2 820 2 0.4902 3.5
0.5 1 31.553 2 63 2.5 81.2 2.5 50.5 4
0.4 1 55.218 3 40 3.5 525 3 0.7 4
3.7 1 0.533 3 7 4 87 5 25 4
0.3 1 90 3.5 19650 5 3.216 4.5
0.5 1.25 15.019 4 3875 5
1.05 1.5 117.42 4 8760 5
3 1.5 4.22 4 153.7 5
0.8 1.5 477.556 4.1 700 8
1.4 1.7 94.772 4.5 150 10
1.2 2 388.5 5
0.3 2 197.166 5
0.4 2 33.306 5
1.8 2 19.524 5
3.6 2 394.417 5
0.32 2 136.625 5
0.8 2.5 20.866 5
10 2.5 56.406 5
0.4 2.5 87.818 5.8
0.3 3 171.387 6
0.49 3 847.855 6
19.7 4 2569.2 6.4
112.5 8 1508.644 7
25.3 8 207.037 8
1000 15 173.543 8
84 16 264 12
Metod  of building the curve and linearization (see the programm for details):
Announced rate of profit is calculated as 1/(time of return) and form column1 of FullTable for each region.
Points (ProfitRate, InestmentVolume) describing a project from initial data are gathered in FullTable
column1 and column3 respectively, descending by column1. Column2 (accumulated investments) describes
sum of column3 precessing figures, each figure averaged with the next point, to fit the integral. Columns 1,2
of the resulting table with profit rate between Pmin=0.10 and Pmax=0.50 yield InvestmentTable (IT), whise
data are marked by grey square on the plots. This part is linearized. The difference between initial and
linearized curves above Pmin=0.10 prodices the correcting constant CI.s
-------------------------------------
Results:
Novgorod: PPmax= 1.25     , Kmax= 30878.8     , Imin05= 14     , Imax01= 27  =>
 IT= {{1/2, 416.}, {1/2, 434.75}, {1/2, 443.5}, {1/2,
      470.9999999999999}, {1/2, 538.5}, {1/2, 587.5}, {0.4, 601.5}, {0.4,
      736.5000000000001}, {0.4, 866.5}, {1/3, 875.2500000000001}, {1/3,
41
      885.125}, {1/4, 1137.499999999999}, {1/8, 2790.}, {1/8, 4512.5}}











 Inv(p) = 3905.74     -7338.68 p  =>
 Pmax= 0.532213    , g=1/Pmax= 1.87895
 total profit CI0= 1124.94     , Int[Inv(p)]= 1002.65    , CI=CI0-IntInv= 122.293
------------------------------ -------------------------- ----------------------------
 Buryatia ,  29,
 PPmax= 0.526316
   , Kmax= 7921.96
   , Imin05= 2
   , Imax01= 28  =>
 IT= {{1/2, 24.968}, {1/2, 53.88999999999999}, {1/2,
      82.10099999999998}, {1/2, 107.1464999999999}, {1/3, 150.532}, {1/3,
      178.4074999999999}, {0.2857142857142856, 223.674}, {1/4, 276.1835}, {
      1/4, 342.403}, {1/4, 403.2230000000001}, {0.2439024390243902,
      644.1110000000001}, {0.2222222222222222, 930.2750000000001}, {1/5,
      1171.911}, {1/5, 1464.744}, {1/5, 1579.98}, {1/5, 1606.395}, {1/5,
      1813.3655}, {1/5, 2078.8865}, {1/5, 2157.632}, {1/5, 2196.268}, {
      0.1724137931034482, 2268.38}, {1/6, 2397.9825}, {1/6, 2907.6035}, {
      0.15625, 4616.131}, {1/7, 6655.053000000001}, {1/8, 7512.8935}, {1/8,
      7703.1835}}
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 Inv(p) = 5048.16     -12421. p  =>
 Pmax= 0.406421    , g=1/Pmax= 2.4605
 total profit CI0= 1376.76    , Int[Inv(p)]= 963.735    , CI=CI0-IntInv= 413.029
----------------------
 Tyumen’ Nrows= , 13 ,
 PPmax= 1\/2             , Kmax= 33529.3000000000063`
         , Imin05= 2
         , Imax01= 13










 Inv(p) = 37058.7      -82002.9 p  =>
 Pmax= 0.451919     , g=1/Pmax= 2.21279
 total profit CI0= 6731.42    , Int[Inv(p)]= 7963.74     , CI=CI0-IntInv= -1232.32
-----------------------
  Chita:   Nrows= , 7 ,
PPmax= 1 , Kmax= 3805.
   , Imin05= 3
   , Imax01= 7  =>
 IT= {{1/2, 1473.45}, {1/2, 2745.3}, {0.4, 3195.9}, {1/3,
      3499.}, {1/5, 3805.}}
   =>
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 Inv(p) = 5232.15      -5918.33 p  =>
 Pmax= 0.884058     , g=1/Pmax= 1.13115
 total profit CI0= 2108.33     , Int[Inv(p)]= 2283.17     , CI=CI0-IntInv= -174.842
-------
  Hackassia , 8,
PPmax= 0.526316     , Kmax= 87.8604
   , Imin05= 2
   , Imax01= 8  =>
 IT= {{0.4, 9.035}, {1/3, 9.366100000000001}, {
      0.2857142857142856, 9.807299999999999}, {1/4, 35.3024}, {1/4,
      60.9024}, {1/4, 73.75239999999999}, {0.2222222222222222,
      87.86039999999998}}







 Inv(p) = 161.31      -423.42 p  =>
 Pmax= 0.380969     , g=1/Pmax= 2.62488
 total profit CI0= 24.8277    , Int[Inv(p)]= 28.6099     , CI=CI0-IntInv= -3.78227
-------------------
The program:
(** Start making Inv.curve **)
ClearAll[IList0,IList1,IList,Kmax,PPmax,Pmax,Pmx,ITFull0,ITFull,ITF];
IList1={"Novgorod (1 row corrected)", 29 ,
"Investm.($bln.*25->Roubles)"," Return-time(years)",
2.19, 0.8,   1, 1,    0.5, 1,     0.7, 1,......
IList5={"Chita ", 7 ,
 "Investm.(trln.R.)","  Return-time(years)  ",





IList= IList1[[Range[5, Leng ] ]]; RegName=IList1[[1]];
(*Print["IList1=",IList1,];*)
 PiMin=0.1;PiMax=0.51;
  ITFull0 = Table[{1/IList[[2*i+2]], Sum[IList[[2*k+1]],ak,0, ia],  IList[[2*i+1]] }, ai,0, NRows-1a];
 (*=InvestFullDataTable0, we added summed investments to 3-rd column:*)
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 ITFull =  Table[{1/IList[[2*i+2]],
Sum[IList[[2*k+1]],ak,0, ia]-0.5*IList[[2*i+1]],  IList[[2*i+1]] }, ai,0, NRows-1a];  (*=InvestFullDataTable, we averaged neighbore
investments in 2-rd column to get closer the integral of the curve to
 the sum of 3-rd column:*)
ITF0 =Table[{ITFull0[[i,1]],ITFull0[[i,2]]}, ai,1,NRowsa];
ITF =Table[{ITFull[[i,1]],ITFull[[i,2]]}, ai,1,NRowsa]; (*=PlotListTable optimistic, while pessimistic/2 one below: *)
ITF2 =Table[{ITFull[[i,1]]/2,ITFull[[i,2]]}, ai,1,NRowsa];




IT =Table[{ITFull[[i,1]],ITFull[[i,2]]}, ai,Imin05, Imax01a];(* Selected-Data Table*) Clear[i];
Print[RegName,"
","Approximation of Inv.-Curve from FTable:"];
(*Print["IList=",InputForm[IList]]; *)
Print["ITFull=", TableForm[ITFull ] ];
Print["PPmax=",PPmax,", Kmax=",Kmax,", Imin05=",Imin05,", Imax01=",Imax01," =>"];(* bounds of Data selection*)
Print["IT=",InputForm[IT]];
 <<Graphics`MultipleListPlot`;
 LPFull= MultipleListPlot[ITF, ITF0, PlotJoined-> True ,  DisplayFunction -> Identity, (* PlotStyle -> {{Thickness[0.005],
GrayLevel[0.5]}}, *)
  PlotStyle -> {GrayLevel[0.1], Dashing[{Dot, Dash}]},  SymbolShape -> {PlotSymbol[Box], PlotSymbol[Triangle]},  SymbolStyle -
> {GrayLevel[0.1], GrayLevel[.9]},  PlotRange->{0,Kmax} ];
  vertices={{PiMin,-10},{PiMin,0.75*Kmax},{PiMax,0.75*Kmax},{PiMax,-10}};
Boxx=Graphics[{Thickness[.015], (*RGBColor[0,0,0.9],*) GrayLevel[0.8], Line[vertices] (*Circle[{0.7,0.7},0.7]*)}];
Inv[x_]=Fit[IT,{1,x},x];(*=Investm.Curve from approximation*)
 PIC=Plot[Inv[x], {x, 0.0, PiMax}, AxesLabel-> {"Pi","Inv"}, (*PlotRange-> {-0.1,Ymax+0.1},*)   PlotStyle -> {{Thickness[0.02],
GrayLevel[0.5] (*, RGBColor[0,1,0]*)}}  , DisplayFunction->Identity ];
Show[LPFull,Boxx,PIC, PlotLabel-> RegName, AxesLabel-> {"Profit","Inv, trln.R."}, DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction ];
(* LP= MultipleListPlot[IT, PlotJoined-> True,  DisplayFunction -> Identity, PlotRange->{0,0.3*Kmax} ];
 Show[LP, PIC, Boxx, (*ITFull,*) PlotLabel-> "Approximated Selected Data", AxesLabel-> {"G.Profit","Investments"},
DisplayFunction -> $DisplayFunction   ]; *)
  (*Print["PiMin=",PiMin,", PiMax=",PiMax," =>"];
  Print["Imin05=",Imin05,", Imax01=",Imax01," =>"];*)
  Print["Inv(p) =", StandardForm[Inv[p]]," =>"];
 Xsol= Solve[Inv[Pmax]==0,Pmax]; Pmx=Pmax/.Xsol[[1]]; g=1/Pmx;
 Print["Pmax=",Pmx,", g=1/Pmax=", g];
 (*Print["Pmx=",Pmx,", Relative Imax= Pmx*g=1"];*)
 (**Now calculate total profit of ignored best projects, like Sum-Int:**)
 For[k=1;TotInv=0,k<=Imax01,k++, TotInv=TotInv+ITFull[[k, 3]]; CI0=Sum[ITFull[[i, 1]]*ITFull[[i, 3]], {i,1,k(*Imax01-1*)} ]  ];
Print["CI0=",CI0,", Pi>0.1-TotInv=",TotInv,"=",ITFull[[Imax01, 2]]];
 (**=Sum[Prof*Invest] of all above 10% (realised) projects **)
 IntInv=Integrate[Inv[p],{p,PiMin,Pmx}]+PiMin*Inv[PiMin];(**=Int[Prof*Invest], of all realised projects. Now the difference: **)
 CI=CI0-IntInv;
 Print["for Pi>0.10-projects total profit CI0=",CI0,", Int[Inv(p)]=",IntInv,", CI=CI0-IntInv=",CI,
 ">0.1averageProfit=",CI0/TotInv]; Print[" end ",RegName,"--------------- ---"]; ]
--------------------------------
 APPENDIX  B2.  Empirical story: Novgorod example
To better realize reasons and way of thinking of an investment-seeking regional administration, we
have chosen the one most known for its investment- favorable policy, that is Novgorod Velikii. We visited
the city for 2 days, contacting with the administration members, with its communist political opposition,
with occasional citizens. We are grateful to generous informational help of the heads of departments,
especially to the head of foreign investment dept. O.Klimov, to the head of industry and communications
dept. A.Mosolov. We concentrate here on motive-revealing in a journalist manner, more profound or
detailed information on Novgorod investment success one can find in numerous publications, including
Kuznetsova[8],  [3]-Arkin et all, [21]-Polishchuk, [Y.Kantor ``Right for victory''-Izvestia 9.1999 ].
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The facts and intuitions gathered may be summarized as follows.
1)Stylized facts on initial conditions, politics and policy.
Novgorod is not a large region (750 thousands inhabitants) with no outstanding opportunities in any
sense. Its only relative advantage is being close to large consumer-goods markets like Moscow and S.-
Petersburg, that is prominent mainly in comparison with Siberian regions. The main industries remains to be
chemical (nitrate fertilizers and other nitrates, mainly), and electronics, depressed by low funds for weapon
production. May be, it is the absence of something like oil pipe, that prevented Novgorod from too deep
attention of strong Mafia groups.
In 1991 the famous now Novgorod governor M.Prusak (formerly - agricultural director) was appointed
by B.Elzin, later Prusak was elected, and recently, in 1999 autumn - reelected again with wonderful for
crisis-feeling Russia supporting majority (92\%). From the very beginning he tried to keep most prominent
specialists in regional administration, he did not change them neither for friends and relatives, nor for
businessmen. In addition, he tried to keep them out of business operations, paying enough and keeping
discipline, so he has a team. He managed also to keep peace with Novgorod legislative authority, by making
it a small body (28 persons) including all heads of local administrations (depending upon the governor in
some aspects, as stressed by governor's opposition), and by careful considering interests and opinions (as
stressed by his followers). This allowed him to quickly implement both legislative and administrative steps
of his known investment-attraction policy.
2)The motives.
The reasons for which M.Prusak had started in 1992 his known effective investment-attractive policy
are expressed by different referents as ``just being a decent person'' (his followers) or as ``playing a big
political game, hoping for high Moscow positions'' (his opposition), that does not too much contradict on
another. In any case, this governor having enough power in the region shows preference rather to maximize
his glory and popularity, then current personal income welfare of his relatives (he has almost none). There
were no compromise materials during his election company, and the opposition could not express clearly
their impression of governor as ``dishonest'', replying to our direct questions. Moreover, the climate in
regional administration seemed to be rather industrious and enthusiastic towards investment attraction and
regional development, most specialists had ``team spirit'' and eagerly went into all details describing the
means and tools to develop their region.
3)The means and tools.
For our study disappointing at first glance was the opinion of administration specialists, referring tax
relieves as being  of secondary importance for investment attraction, among the tools used by the governor
and his team. They say, that the major factor is the confidence of investors in stability of favorable
conditions, provided by administration, in administration's motivation to develop the region by good
investment climate and to establish such reputation. In this context tax relieves or holidays are meaningful
not as such, but rather like a  sign of administration eagerness to play a fair game with investors. However,
the specialists note, that for some firms the sum of the tax relieves amounts to considerable figures, also
crucial for decision to invest in this particular region. This was the case with Cadbury-Schweps
Corporation. Other tools of administration are of organizational character: - supplying possible investors
with all necessary information; - attaching administration officer to every prominent project for solving
problems with loaning or buying land, getting access to communications, getting all necessary permissions
from medical, legal, fireman authorities, and so on.
The technology of granting tax holidays is halfway to perfect discrimination. The projects seeking
holidays must be presented to administration, they are audited by administration and by external foreign
firm with good reputation. The repay-time is detected, according to standard declared methodic, through
calculation of profits. The tax holiday is always granted by administration (not by legislators) for full repay-
time, that is up to restoration of capital. All presented projects get holidays, except bad in ecological aspect,
or those, seeming to be a financial afera. Thus, administration though having by Novgorod law at its
disposal enough power to grant relieves only to favorite enterprises, in practice treats by equal method (low
or absent corruption). But it discriminates in favor of the budget, and discriminates in a fashion close to
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ideal discrimination theoretically prescribed: all (big) projects are treated individually (it is a big job) and
stronger projects get less tax relives, proportionally. It could work even better, closer to perfect
discrimination, if not for federal-law restrictions.
4)Our conclusions.
The organizational help can be considered being a cost-lowering tool,
similar to tax relief in our context. We suppose it to have the same impact, so abstein from modeling it
as a different factor.
On the other hand, ``reputation'' considerations, being realistic, drive us to describe the region-investor
game as a typical Bayesian equilibrium, where the investors try to realize the ``type'' of the region in
question, while the region chose between ``predatory'' behavior and ``peaceful'' behavior towards investors.
At the moment we are not able to enrich our Nash-equilibrium model by these considerations. However, in
aggregated thinking, more or less predation looks like more or less taxes, while ``peace'' looks like tax
relieves. So our arguments may well be valid for an enriched Bayesian setting also. So, summarizing, we
have not thrown away our theoretical views after meeting with practical specialists.
 APPENDIX  C3. Estimates of investment-curve parameters by 5 projects data
For thorough estimating investment curves and idle-capital curves, one should collect comprehensive
regional data on accomplished investment projects, data on idle and semi-alive facilities, data connecting
profit and volume parameters of each unit of capital. We are unable to find these within the present study.
Even the most informative administration – Novgorod administration – promises now to make such data
available only in 2000. Instead we have at hand some data on  proposed in 1997 large and medium-size
projects, offered by entrepreneurs to 19 regional administrations and for different purposes - it is Novgorod
(here projects supplied for arranging tax-relief documents) and 18 Siberian regions . These packages of
projects include mostly the reconstruction and new projects reported by large enterprises. The Siberian
projects within the 18 packages were written by enterprises and some new projectors for attracting various
investors, including governmental ones. They were supplied to governors in reply to the request of regional
authorities, some of them intended to compete for federal support, as having positive external effects on the
regions. These 18 packages were ``approved'' in 1997 by governors (with unclear benefits from the
approval). According to Siberian expert in investment N.Kravchenko, the volume of projects included in a
package may amount to 50-70\% of all investment projects  written in the region. In addition, demand for
capital includes  unwritten projects, implemented without external investments by enterprises, so it is more
likely that a package amounts to 50\% of total region's ``investment intentions'', then hypothesis 70\%. No
clear considerations were formulated about ``included'' projects being commonly more or less profitable
then non-included, we shall suppose the same profitability.
Unfortunately, only 5 of the packages supply data on projects' (announced) profitability.
These profit-reporting 5 regions are:
Novgorod — typical in resources European region (but outstanding administration);
Chita — typical East-Siberian industrial and resource-extracting region (depressive),
Hackassia, Buryaia — South-Siberian resource-extracting regions
(depressive),
Tyumen' — North-Siberian oil-extracting region.
Projects at hand are described in various quality of detalization: some are just preliminary proposals,
others have technical and economical calculation, or even a detailed business-plan. Each project include the
needed for our purpose two figures: volume of investment and expected return-time (years). The ``return-
time'', supposingly, is simply investment volume divided by annual expected gross profit. The data in tables
and plots see in the end of Appendix.
Naturally, we suppose the information to be biased in several aspects.
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1)Risk aspect. The announced gross profit figure implies ``everything-O'K'' assumption. So,  to convert
it into its  “warranted”  profit equivalent, needed for our model, one must diminish it several times. Relying
on our intuition, we suppose, say, at least  2-3 times (so the announced net profit of Russian project should
be  >10\% when the investor can invest abroad for transfer-cost-cleared 5\%).
2)Intentional project author's optimism or pessimism. In those regions, where longer return-time is the
legal basis for longer tax relief, the investor may have intention to overestimate return-time in his project.
However, consultations with Novgorod regional authorities assured us that this tendency is neutralized by
thorough economic calculations accomplished by the administration and invited auditing firms. This may
not be the case in other regions. On the other hand, when a project is not launched by a sufficient-funded
investor, but instead it is used by an entrepreneur to get credit, such projector has the opposite intention: to
overestimate profit. This case we suppose to be more common, but how should we select ``clean'' projects?
At the moment we included the correction in this respect into risk-factor estimate.
3)Low-profit projects. There are politically motivated projects proclaimed by regional administration,
like electric station and international airport in Novgorod. In spite of their expected low profits, they have
chance to be implemented, with the help of public funds, in some way. We should, naturally, exclude such
low-profit projects from general-purpose investment curve, which describes demand for capital. Similarly,
but for other reasons, we should exclude private low-profit projects, having Western-warranted equivalent
of their announced profit below 5\%.
4)High-profit projects. For linear approximating investment curve, intended to reflect sensitivity of
investment to taxes, we should take into account only the region presumably affected by expected shifts of
tax relieves. Relying here again on our intuition, we suppose Western-warranted profit, say, between 3\%
and 17\%, that is announced profit between 10\% and 50\ (not to take too narrow interval for
approximation). However, high-profit projects remains in calculation of regional total taxes and tax
revenues, forming the constants  CI, as explained in subsection on linearization, and in examples.
Here is an example of such correction. Initial pictures of announced profits for 5 regions see in the last
Appendix, being  plotted in absolute (bln. roubles) terms. The selected zone of a graph between 10\ and
50\% is approximated and the resulting function is plotted together with the dotted diagram. The diagram
actually approximated does slightly differ from the initial data. It is corrected so as to eliminate systematic
error distinguishing integral of the function from the square of diagram calculated as total profit of discrete
projects. The results are converted into relative terms (maximal possible investments volume is taken for 1),
they should be converted later into ``warranted'' or ``expected'' profit terms (dividing profits by risk-factor
r, so multiplying curve slope by  r ). Our 5 regions showed some variety of the explored parameters:
—Investment-curve parameters revealed from announced projects of 5 regions——
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1)Novgorod, 29 projects (1 unrealistic project rejected => 28):
Threshold parameters:
PPmax= 1.25 , Kmax= 30878.8 , Imin05= 14 , Imax01= 27 = >
Results:
 Inv(p) =3905.74-7338.68p=>Pmax=0.532213,g=1/Pmax=1.87895 total profit  CI0=
 1124.94,Integral[Inv(p)]=1002.65,CI1=CI0-IntInv=122.293, in relative
terms it is  CI=  122.293/1002.65=.12197
''CI0=44.9977*25 =1124.9 , (''Pi ''TotInv) = 193.15*25 =4828.8 Roubles.
' averageProfit=''0.232968
—————————-
2)Buryatia , 29 projects,
Threshold parameters:




total profit CI0=  1376.76,Integral[Inv(p)]=963.735,CI1=CI0-IntInv=413.029
,, in relative terms it is  CI=413.029/963.735=.42857
''CI0=''1376.76 '', (''Pi ''TotInv) =7789.96 Roubles
' averageProfit=''0.176736
———————-
3)Tyumen , 13 projects,
Threshold parameters:
PPmax= 1/\/2 , Kmax= 33529.30` , Imin05= 2 , Imax01= 13 = >
Results:
 Inv(p) =37058.7-82002.9p=>Pmax=0.451919,g=1/Pmax=2.21279 total profit  CI0=
 6731.42,Int[Inv(p)]=7963.74,CI1=CI0-IntInv=-1232.32, , in relative terms
it is  CI=-1232.32/7963.74=-.15474




Threshold parameters: PPmax= 1 , Kmax= 3805. , Imin05= 3 , Imax01= 7 =  >
Results:
 Inv(p) =5232.15-5918.33p=>Pmax=0.884058,g=1/Pmax=1.13115 total profit
CI0=2108.33,Int[Inv(p)]=2283.17,CI1=CI0-IntInv=-174.842,  CI=-174.842 ,
in relative terms it is  -174.842/2283.17=-0.076579
''CI0=''2108.33 '', (''Pi ''TotInv) =''3848.5
averageProfit=0.547832
——————-
5)Hackassia , 8 projects,
Threshold parameters: PPmax= 0.526316 , Kmax= 87.8604 , Imin05= 2 , Imax01=8 = >
Results:
 Inv(p) =161.31-423.42p=>Pmax=0.380969,g=1/Pmax=2.62488 total profit CI0=
24.8277,Int[Inv(p)]=28.6099,CI=CI0-IntInv=-3.78227 , in relative terms it
is  -3.78227/28.6099=-.1322
''CI0=''24.8277 '', (''Pi ''TotInv) =''89.4684 .
' averageProfit=''0.277502
———————————




Average Announced Profit=  (0.232968+0.176736+0.200314+0.547832+0.277502)/5=0.28707.
Solving  1-2.0617p=0, we get maximal profit    p=0.48504   of
the average announced curve.
——————————-
***************************************************
So, our 5 regions showed some variety of the  announced in the projects parameters:
 1.1≤ g≤ 2.6,  -0.15*II≤ CI≤ 0.43  *II (where  II denotes the integral of the linear investment curve). To
transform these parameters into  expected parameters, we should multiply  g by some risk factor. For
instance, with hypothesis of risk-factor= (announced profit)/(expected profit) =2- >
''Expected'' C is  0.037404/2=0.018702, ''Expected''  Pmax is  Pmaxaverage=0.53112/2;=0.26556,
''Expected''  gaverage is  2.0617*2=4.1234
Risk-factor, here taken for 2, will be better estimated in the next Appendix.
We add tables and  plots of the described estimation in th last Appendix.
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 APPENDIX  D4: Estimates of investment parameters by statistical data and by 19 projects' data.
1) Let us roughly estimate typical for Russia investment parameters  p,x,y – alternative profit and taxes.
We suppose essential outflow of Russian capital abroad, reported by many sources. Therefore, for
capital market there is an opportunity to invest abroad, say, for real warranted  net (tax-cleared) profit rate
like 5\%, i.e.  p=0.05. This  0.05 will be the lower investment limit in our estimates. Further, to this we
should add taxes to see expected (warranted)  gross profit lower limit.
Normally, main 3 taxes are: 0.20 VAT, 0.02 property tax, 0.35 profit tax. It is too cumbersome to
introduce VAT correctly into our model, it deserves introducing wages. For our purposes, i.e. for describing
reaction of investment to tax relives, it seems sufficient to describe VAT in simplified way. That is, suppose
fixed Wages/Capital ratio, then some part of VAT is attached to capital like property tax, while some is
attached to profit like profit tax (that makes great difference for sensitivity to taxes). The remaining
numerous taxes on business are mainly VAT-like, we shall include them similarly.
Now we should find the needed proportions. Goskomstat reported in 1996 total country's tax revenues
CTR= 474541177.t.Roubles, including VAT = 134527611. (  28\%CTR), profit tax = 100603670. =
(21\%CTR), property tax = 35773195. = (7.5\%CTR), personal income tax (roughly) gives  13\%CTR (??).
The remaining  30.5\% are excise (12\%CTR??), local taxes and other, that all will be attached to VAT in
our calculations (being gathered, mostly, also proportional to return), so VAT-like taxes named VATLike =
1.0-0.21-0.075-0.13=0.585 of total tax burden of an enterprise.
We can compare this with a regional data. In country-average regional tax revenues 1996: RTR=
267718172., VAT = 42536054. =0.159RTR, profit tax = 64396171. =0.24RTR property tax = 35773195.
=0.133RTR,
In particular, in Novosibirsk region 1998: RTR = 1838.2 b.Roubles, profit tax = 563.6 =0.306RTR ,
VAT = 408.1/1838.2 =0.222RTR, income tax = 251.8=0.137* 1838.2 (0.137RTR), natural resources 2.0,
excise =  220.7=0.12 RTR , property tax about  0.133RTR (?), then remains  1.0-0.306-0.222-0.137-0.12-
0.133=0.082 - the local taxes.
We need also profit/wages ratio. Total country’s profit is 100603670./0.35 =287440000.,
100603670./x=21/13, so, total personal-income-tax revenue is:  x=62278000., then incomes (close to
wages) are  (62278000.)/0.12=518980000. Then  287440000./(5.1898× 108) =0.55386. So, about a half of
VATLike taxes can be described as profit-dependent, and half are capital- dependent. So, to express all
taxes on business in 2 forms, we should increase proportionally both property tax and profit tax multiplying
by  (0.585+0.210+0.075)/(0.210+0.075) =3.0526.
Then average enterprise's tax structure (without tax relieves) in our model should look not like
(PropertyTax,ProfitTax,Other...) = (0.02,0.35,...), but like (PropertyLikeTaxes,ProfitLikeTaxes) =
(0.06,1.05) - huge result. We should take instead that VAT and other taxes double tax burden (0.04,0.70),
relatively to only property and profit taxes, but not triple it. By tax relieves the first, capital- proportional
component of tax burden can be reduced by 0.02, the second (profit- proportional) - by 0.22, so 0.02  <x
<0.04, 0.35 <y <70 (we decrease the lower bound for profit having in mind possible tricks). We can express
the same simpler: suppose roughly 1/2 of VAT and the like being related to wages, which are more or less
attached to capital in most industries, and the remaining 1/2 - to profit. Suppose VAT burden being nearly
the same as both other taxes together, and get (0.04,0.70).  So, below warranted gross profit  p=0.10 or
p=0.09 it is unreasonable to invest in Russia without tax relieves or tax evasion. These figures we use as
follows.
2)Let us estimate ``profit-risk-factor''  r= (Announced Profit)/(Expected Profit).
Unable to good such estimates now, let us take rough ones at least.
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1-st source) Compare the revealed average planned (announced)  projects profit  0.28707 with average
country's profitability reported by Goskomstat: 1995:  π =0.074, 1996:  π =0.022, 1997:  π =0.023 (biased
by equity reestimation in 1996, by tax evasion, etc.).
       We see announced profit being roughly  10 times more then profit of existing Russian enterprises!
So, rough measure of risk factor (Planned Profit)/(Realized Profit) =10. It can be somewhat more if we take
into account dead projects not shown in average statistics of profit. However, there may be as well strong
factors, reducing this huge risk gap. 1)May be, the old capital is mostly obsolete, so new projects are really
much better then existing facilities, at least twice, comparing  pmin =0.05 with  π =0.022. 2)Real profit for
investors accumulated somewhere in offshore companies may be several times more then one reported to
fiscal authorities, taking into account multiplicity of grey and black currencies, and other tools of tax
evasion. For instance, aluminum industry was named in papers as hiding abroad about 5/6 of its profits, with
the help of tolling. Unable to estimate such things correctly, we can only guess about risk factor being  r=
(Planned Profit)/(Realized Profit) <10.
2-nd source) On the other hand, for the same purpose we can examine something that we name
``volume risk-factor''. The described 18 Siberian investment-project collections for 1997 (including only
announced big enterprise investments), compared with investments of the same regions in 1997 (including,
unfortunately, all private investments, that we suppose 2 times more) shows great variety of the following
kind:
 2.5 < V= (Proposed Investment Volume)/(Realized Investment Volume) < 10 (average is about 4).
That is, least optimistic projectors were wrong 2.5*2 times, while best optimists overestimated their
ability to find investors 10*2 times! Explaining this, we can suppose, that the gathered projects are the all
available projects with  planned net profit above 5\%. However, investors take also risk factor into account,
so they invest only when  expected profit is above  5\%. Then the optimism measure  V∈ [5,20] can be
called the volume risk-factor.
    Let us try to convert these volume risk-factor figures into profit risk-factor. We can compare these
[5,20] with the revealed from 5 regions average announced-investment curve  I(p) =(Im-gp) =
1-2.0617p, or more correctly, with the built before similar function, depending upon taxes also:
I(p,x,y) = (Im-gp-gx-yIm+gyx)/(1-y) =
 = (1-g0.05-g0.04-0.70+g0.70*0.04)/(1-0.70)\ =1.0-0.20667g (we have substituted taxes 0.04. 0.70
and alternative profit 0.05). [Variant: smaller profit-dependent taxes 0.50 give us  (1-g0.05-g0.04-
0.50+g0.50*0.04)/(1-0.50)\ =1.0-0.14g]. Analogous function for expected profit is the same, but the slope
parameter  g must be increased  r times, since profit decreases. So, we can form equation  (1.0-
0.20667g)/(1.0-0.20667g*r) =V for volume factor V. Substituting the revealed former factor  g=2.0617 we
get  (1.0-0.20667*2.0617)/(1.0-0.20667*2.0617*r) =V,  Solution is :    r=2.3469× 10-9(-5.7391× 108+1.0×
109V)/V=2.3469(1-0.57391/V)  ,
[Variant with 0.04,050:  (1.0-0.14g)/(1.0-0.14g*r) =V, Solution is :    r=0.14286(-
50.0+7.0*2.0617+50.0V)/V  = (7.143-5.0813/V) . ]
Now substitute ``volume risk-factor'':  20->r=2.3469(1-0.57391/20) =2.2796 - maximal profit-risk
factor . Analogously, minimal ``volume risk factor''  r=2.3469(1-0.57391/5) =2.0775.
These figures  2.1<r<2.3 are free from tax evasion bias, since they come from the revealed decision to
invest. They may be biased by (all projects)/(big projects) <2 difference, but we see that with somewhat
different V the solution show almost the same figures, it is non-sensitive to this bias.
Note, new average figure  r=2.2<10 is lower then 10 revealed from Goskomstat's "profitability". So,
we can guess country's average profit-risk factor (Planned Profit)/(Realized Profit) being about 2.2. Then
average investment curve in expected-profit terms must look like  I(p) =1-2.06*2.2*p, that is moderate
sensitivity . It seems acceptable. Similar calculations with greater alternative net profit  0.09 showed us
lower risk-factor like  r=1.4, also acceptable.
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Really, too big risk-factor  r and big sensitivity factor  g both would seem unrealistic in common
intuition. May be, if really having average 2.2% profit, Russian businessmen would be so sensitive to tax
relief for 2%  (like total abolishing of capital tax) as to increase investments for 0.4 units (where unit is
maximal total possible investment=1), as predicted by the figure  g=20 (coming from Goskomstat figure
r=10). But it is hard to believe, and not reported by experts like Novgorod administration.
We should now try this logic on panel data to better reveal mean values  g and  r.
3-rd source)  Estimates of investment sensitivity to taxes (or to alternative profits) from regression.
As reported in econometrics part, we have some regression estimates of investment sensitivity to
``Investment law'' adoption. The law usually starts tax relieves for investors (and start institutional benefits
also, that biases our logic, but we shall ignore it). The average (across the country) sensitivity of investment
to the law amounted to 0.135 or 0.20 increase in relative volume of investment (under different methods
examined). We should convert this figures now into investment-curve terms.
Let us suppose, more or less typical for the ``Investment law'', 5 years of full tax relief for both
regional taxes in question (0.02 property tax, 0.22 profit tax). What it means in terms of present-value-
equivalent profit?
With supposed ``impatience'' discount 5%, 5-years unit of profit gives present value (utility)
∑t=151/1.05t=4.3295, while eternal profit unit brings  ∑t=1∞ 1/1.05t=20.0, that is 4-5 times more. So, with
discount 5%, 5-years tax relief bringing profit like 0.02 (temporary property tax abolishing) is equivalent in
present-value terms to roughly 0.005 eternal relief of this tax. Analogously, we suppose 5-years profit tax
relief for 0.22 being equivalent to eternal 0.05 profit tax relief .
Let us substitute this into the investment curve and formulate the equation to find “expected'' sensitivity
slope  g  (thereby we shall find risk factor  r):





Solution is :   g=2.3805 .  This is the lower estimate. We get  r=2.3805/2.06=1.1556.
[Variant with p=0.09- >  (1.0-0.29214g)/(1.0-0.34g) =1.135, Solution lower is :    g=1.4398  . Another
solution (upper estimate) is :    g=2.1756  ]
Let us solve the same with upper estimate of sensitivity:
 2.8571(0.35-.06225g)/(1.0-0.20667g) =1.4, Solution is :    g=3.5881    . So, the announced mean
sensitivity  g=2.06 from the 5 projects is about 1.2-1.5 time lower then  g  here. This means risk factor
r=1.15-1.7418 , somewhat lower, then the revealed from other calculations.
Thus, the estimates of revealed risk factor varies about  1.15≤ r≤ 1.74 . So, average figures like
r=1.5,g=3.0 revealed from the projects seem reasonable.
3)Estimates of variations across regions of investment sensitivity to taxes  g.
Let us come back to volume risk-factor revealed from 18 Siberian investment-project collections for
1997. Its fluctuating from  5 to  20 may be explained as risk-factor fluctuation across regions, or in opposite
direction - as announced-sensitivity factor fluctuation. Indeed, suppose the same across regions risk factor
r=1.5 and solve w.r.t.  g  the equation for the least-optimistic region:
(1-g*0.05-g*(0.04) –0.7+g*0.7*0.04)/(1-1.5g*0.05-1.5g*(0.04) –0.7+1.5g*0.7*0.04) = (0.3-
.062g)/(0.3-0.093g).  Equalize this to least volume risk-factor  (.3-.062g)/(.3-.093g) =5,
Solution is :    g=2.9777  .
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Analogue for most optimists give us  (.3-.062g)/(.3-.093g) =20, Solution is :    g=3.1702  . So, risk-
factor like 1.5 fits well for least-sensitive-to tax regions, and something like  r=1.7 - for more sensitive ones.
We see also, that small sensitivity  g variations may bring substantial jumps in
(AnnouncedDemandForCapital)/(RealInvestment) =V ratio, and vice verse -  g is revealed from figurs
(5,20) with minor variations. So this method can not reveal variation of  g, and in sample calculations we
should take larger variations revealed from the 5 projects.
Summarizing, we should try in our calculations the ``reasonable'' parameters  2.0≤ g≤ 4.0,   Xmin=0.02,
Xmax =0.04, Ymax =0.70,  Ymin=0.40  (we have taken 0.22  for possible tax relief for profit and 0.08 for local
taxes, subtracted these from 0.70),  0.13≤ Yfed=0.26 (the doubled according to VAT-like taxes figure 0.13) ,
p≥ 0.05.  Besides, “preference for current revenue” parameter w1 above 0.3 or 0.5 would mean “extremely
impatient” governor (as revealed roughly in “dynamic section”), so reasonable is w1<0.5.
APPENDIX  E5: Images of the tax-optimizing objective function: plots
Under most parameters, the function within the admissible square looks concave and
pleasant; but for wider range it can be saddle-like , while on unrestricted domain it shous
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>For unreasonable parameters the U surface can be wild like the saddle above. See reverse parabol for  X:
Taking Yfed=0.13; Xmin=-00; Xmax=1; Ymin=0; Ymax=0.99; Km=1; Imm=1; q=1; g=2; pk=0.05; p=0.0;
w1=1; w2=1-w1; w3=0; w4=0;  Partially-convex shape of  U= ((0.95-x-y+x*y)*(x+(-0.13+y)*(1/2-x+
(0.95-x-y+x*y)/(2*(1-y)))))/(1-y); at the point:    U=0.3999999999999998-
0.6533333333333333*x+0.08000000000000007*x2]}
APPENDIX  F6.  Description of the concavity numerical test
Concavity, or at least quasi-concavity of our utility function U(x,y) is needed to be sure in absence
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of several isolated local maxima. It helps optimization, and helps proving that optimal decisions
(Xopt[K,p,...], Yopt[K,p,...]) are continuous functions of parameters, that enables proving equilibria
existence.
It is easy to check numerically (see our plots, with zigzag w.r.t. y argument), that on the broad
admissible square (x,y) ∈ [0,1]*[0,1] of optimization arguments the needed properties are absent. However,
much smaller area [Xmin, Xmax]*[Ymin, Ymax]  is practically important, and the properties may well hold on it,
so we tested this hypothesis.
The function U(x,y) being too cumbersome, it is hard to analytically find the exact parameters domain,
providing concavity or quasi-concavity. So, we decided to test this empirically by direct multiple random
test, searching for the triples of points violating concavity or quasi-concavity of the function.
The test was implemented as follows. Generally speaking, we should search across all
admissible values of all function parameters:
  q,g, pi,p, w1,w2, v3, v4, y,x, Xfed,Yfed,Ks,Kw, Imax, Xmin, Xmax, Ymin,Ymax, CI,CK.
 Actually, we fixed some parameters on their “most probable” level (see empirical
argumentation in Appendix):
 pi=0, p=0.05, Xfed =0, Yfed=0.35, Xmin=0.02, Xmax=0.04, Ymin=0.35,Ymax=0.60, Imax=1,
Ks=10, Kw=1, (i.e. d=0.1), CI=0, CK=0,
while preference for development w2=1- w1 was attached to w1, and  v3, v4  were
attached to w1,w2, like (v3, v4) = (w1,w2)*Coeff,  where Coeff ∈ [3,15] was varied with
step 1: Coeff  = 3, 4, 5, ...,15, (it describes different impatience of decision-maker). Other
parameters were varied in intervals q ∈ [2,4], g ∈ [2,4], w1∈ [0,1].
 The program (algorithm) in Mathematica-3.0 language application∗∗ included the
nested cycles of varying parameters [q, g, w1, Coeff], and Niter=500, or 5000  tests of
different triples of (x,y) values for each given values of [q, g, w1, Coeff].
Each tested “triple” consisted of two random points (x,y), (x’,y’)  (two values for each
of the two taxes) and third point in between, taken randomly on the interval [(x,y),
(x’,y’)]. Then we compared value of the utility function in the three points, testing
concavity and quasi-concavity (the middle must be not less then the minimum of the
ends). If concavity or quasi-concavity were violated, cycle would be stopped and result
printed.
There were two types of tests with different initial parameters:
First∗∗:
One cycle included Niter=5000 steps with capital tax X varying from 0.02 up to 0.04,
profit tax Y from 0.3 to 0.6. There were 3 nested cycles: weight of revenue in the
objective function (w1) running 11 points from 0 up to 1 with step 0.1, weight of future:
Coeff - from 3 to 15 (step 1) and coefficient of sensitivity of capital and investments to
taxes: q,g, - going from 2 to 4 (step 0.02). Constant values are described above.
Second:
This type is differs only in 3 features: q and g coefficients of sensitivity were taken
(running trough the interval from 2 to 4 with step of 0.02) independently, and one cycle
included 500 (instead of 5000) steps of random “triples”. Besides, Coeff was varying
from 0 up to 15 with step of 1.
There were obtained negative results in both types of tests: we have not found
points in the considered area where concavity or quasi-concavity was violated. Therefore,
it seems plausible that the function is concave in examined interval.
------- -------
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APPENDIX G7.  Optimal tax mixtures under different parameters
                          
 Two-tax direct iterative optimization: sample calculations
Special case of objective function was optimized: w1=0, w2=0, that is the same as taking Ks=0, Kw=0.
When main varying parameters took very high values 3.6< g <3.9,  0.92 < w1 <0.97 – then property tax X
may be chosen not on its lower bound.
On the below plots abscissa is property tax X, ordinate is profit tax Y.
Most calculations give trivial solution: (x=0, y>0). Here we gathered only the nontrivial cases, showing the
threshold values of preference for revenue W1, sufficient to both taxes play some role. This W1 appears to
be too high in all examples, so for usual values (x=0, y>0) is the norm.
1) Low-taxes seria of tests:
Example of interior maximums and swing (almost jump) when 0.90<w1<97
Xmin=0.00; Xmax=0.02; Ymin=0.13; Ymax=0.35; Xfed=0.00; Yfed=0.13;
Km=1;Imm=0; q=2.6(=2.3); g=2; pk=0.18; p=0.09; w1=0.85-0.98 (step
0.005); w2=1-w1; w3=0; w4=0; s=1; t=1;
XYTabl(q=2.6) ="
{{0., 0.13}, {0., 0.1371461190211576},
{0.,      0.1431747655122655}, {0., 0.1490627856878243},
{0., 0.151}, {0.,     0.1554420122919736}, {0., 0.1614405512530125},  {0.,
      0.1672379329004329}, {0., 0.1731835944026733},  {0.,
      0.1847147044390078}, {0., 0.1873333333333333},  {0.,
      0.1910483794799971}, {0.002852377394277547, 0.1939079365079365},
{
      0.00954666310856326, 0.1801200980392156},  {0.01569821428571428,
      0.1691666666666666}, {0.01554499999999999, 0.17825}, {0.02,
      0.1717619047619047}, {0.02, 0.1751079867586833}, {0.02,
      0.1813489039555216}}
XYT2(q=2.3) =" {{0., 0.2320207830825864}, {0.,
      0.237210850041771}, {0., 0.242244246031746}, {0., 0.2472683608058608}, {
      0., 0.2465864747180923}, {0., 0.2517535647917613}, {0., 0.26}, {0.,
      0.2672555261173295}, {0., 0.2722902275270309}, {0.,
      0.2718749781006747}, {0., 0.2767710901027077}, {0.,
      0.2846547619047619}, {0.001112377394277546, 0.2896928860613071}, {
      0.01621339285714286, 0.26}, {0.02, 0.26}, {0.02, 0.2670287698412698}, {
      0.02, 0.2722253465746499}, {0.02, 0.2721399464656431}, {0.02,
      0.2773766456582633}}












Here we see the  jump  swing (continuous) from Xmin to Xmax.  Curve of table  XYTable(q=2.6) is grey.
Horisontal axis is Xopt,
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ordinate is Yopt.   Nearby is the same solution with another starting approximation and more iterations:
We see that greater slope of investment curve g=0.26 implies less optimal taxes then g=0.23, but anyway
under sufficiently high preference for revenu both of them tennds to upper bounds. With peference below
0.85 only  profit tax Y is active.
------------------------------------------------------------
High-taxes seria of tests:
Test 2) The same test, but with higher Yfed ,  and (unreasonably) low Xfed (otherwise no switch to profit
tax, unless too high revenue-preference W1).
Again interior maximums and switch (almost jump) when 0.90<w1<97
Xmin=0.00; Xmax=0.04; Ymin=0.40; Ymax=0.70; Xfed=0.005; Yfed=0.36;
Km=1;Imm=0; qq=2.3;q=qq; g=0; pkk=0.09; pk=pkk; p=0.00; (*w1=0.960;*)
w2=1-w1; w3=0; w4=0; s=1; t=1;Wstart=0.85;
"XYTabl(q=" 2.3
   ") =" {{0., 0.5080910921036476}, {0.,
      0.5100222688776804}, {0., 0.5151244897959184}, {0.,
      0.5177780612244898}, {0., 0.5211927878929759}, {0.,
      0.5249118772719169}, {0., 0.5303193452380952}, {0.01292775211945886,
      0.5146190476190476}, {0.0322725200766638, 0.487599097763223}, {0.04,
      0.4790189143073183}, {0.04, 0.481874320185699}, {0.04,
      0.4863742657977232}, {0.04, 0.4901135949922422}, {0.04,
      0.4942157851020133}, {0.04, 0.4983376231233775}, {0.04,
      0.5024806578838397}, {0.04, 0.5066002380031101}, {0.04,
      0.5107586565674311}, {0.04, 0.5148970388724074}}
-------
"XYT2(q=" 2.4
   ") =" {{0., 0.4920247701992418}, {0.,
      0.4969285714285715}, {0., 0.5016991691408038}, {0.,
      0.5038579955760363}, {0., 0.5090770142202984}, {0.,
      0.5126639572577072}, {0.009849251700170571, 0.5009721311863656}, {
      0.03009917187746971, 0.4706610372340426}, {0.04, 0.4561745958444539}, {
      0.04, 0.4623373084546342}, {0.04, 0.4649205079675428}, {0.04,
      0.4710886154296128}, {0.04, 0.4754774113574564}, {0.04,
      0.4781033186819779}, {0.04, 0.4824900400755151}, {0.04,
      0.4886831693365369}, {0.04, 0.4913190146442014}, {0.04,
      0.4969285714285715}, {0.04, 0.5001935061345262}}







"Grey curve is the first: XYTable"
"[Km,Imm,w1,w2,w3,w4,q,g,pk,p,s,t, Xmin,Ymin]=" 1    "," 0    "," w1    "," 1-w1      "," 0    "," 0    "," 2.3




Test 3) The same test, but with higher Yfed and Wstart:,  with too high profit rate p=0.09, with
somewhat more reasonable Xfed  but too high revenue-preference W1 are needed for switching taxes to
profit tax X.:
Xmin=0.00; Xmax=0.04; Ymin=0.40; Ymax=0.70; Xfed=0.005; Yfed=0.26;
Km=1;Imm=0; qq=2.3;q=qq; g=0; pkk=0.09; pk=pkk; p=0.00; (*w1=0.960;*)
w2=1-w1; w3=0; w4=0; s=1; t=1;Wstart=0.89;
"XYTabl(q=" 2.3
   ") =" {{0., 0.511065297216694}, {0.,
      0.514570591859502}, {0., 0.5162762234827509}, {0.,
      0.5197792843088127}, {0., 0.5232971966624091}, {0.,
      0.5268015375809423}, {0., 0.5320906681324725}, {0.,
      0.5338005762873732}, {0., 0.5373276721240212}, {0.,
      0.5426124986227209}, {0., 0.5461494625868049}, {0.,
      0.5496720220591678}, {0., 0.5532149929298934}, {0.,
      0.5567605802770597}, {0., 0.5603162434708522}, {0.,
      0.5628887755102041}, {0.01308904583375438, 0.55}, {0.04,
      0.5157413068007123}, {0.04, 0.5197477991196479}}
"XYT2(q=" 2.4
   ") =" {{0., 0.4969285714285715}, {0.,
      0.5020084091909046}, {0., 0.5039350103308235}, {0.,
      0.5076608681009009}, {0., 0.513186868232281}, {0.,
      0.5151188656943404}, {0., 0.5206363883713}, {0., 0.5226066687226607}, {
      0., 0.5263512237224981}, {0., 0.5318862676196959}, {0.,
      0.5356467860226599}, {0., 0.5394159015344853}, {0.,
      0.5431964858707257}, {0., 0.5452056138261957}, {0., 0.55}, {
      0.01955239087471502, 0.5257630151339713}, {0.03910159028658682,
      0.4999955126503571}, {0.04, 0.5018568791333363}, {0.04,
      0.5055713115981726}}







"Grey curve is the first: XYTable"
"[Km,Imm,w1,w2,w3,w4,q,g,pk,p,s,t, Xmin,Ymin]=" 1
   "," 0    "," w1    "," 1-w1      "," 0    "," 0    "," 2.3    "," 0    "," 0.09    "," 0.    "," 1 1    "," 0.    "," 0.4    ",
WW1 belongs to interval =" {0.895,0.985}      {0.895,0.985}
-----------------
The program used is an heuristic iterative procedure, not using derivatives, only checking function values.
Test for various slopes  q  of investment curve:
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We see zigzag (up-right-up) respond of optima to “preference for revenue” W1   parameter,
for 4 alternative demand-slope parameters q=3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9   : larger q-yields  lower taxes.
----------------------------------------------------
APENDIX H8:  Divergence or convergence: the tax-competition- game
model simulated by computer
 On the below plots abscissa is time, ordinate is capital  K(t).
Test1: Divergence of 2 regions with different goals W1:













                                                                                                           =Test2:  Divergence of 3
regions with different K(r), qq=3.8; bifurcation point is between 1-st and 2-nd the regions,
higher asymptoteis among the first and the second.
Test3:  Convergence; the same 3 regions, but low sensitivity qq=0.8, high asymptote:
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                                                                                   = Test 4: Convergence, with large slope
q, too low G=0.033 gives convergence; i.e. bifurcation point is below all
starting capitals, the asymptote among them:
Test N5  :  Convergence: The same regions with “weak” capital market, :
>










: Low bifurcation point; here too high G gives convergence; i.e. bifurcation
point is below all starting capitals:













Uxy=w1*(x- Xfed)Ks+w1*(y-Yfed)Ks *0.5 (pi+x+1/g)(1-g pi-g x)+
    Kw(1- q p-q x -y+q y x)/(1-y)*
       (w1*(x- Xfed+(y-Yfed)*((0.5+0.5(1-q p-q x -y+q y x)/(1-y) –q x )/q))+
          w2)+Imax(1- g pi-g x -y+g y x)/(1-y)*
       (v3*(x- Xfed+(y-Yfed)*((0.5+0.5(1-g pi-g x -y+g y x)/(1-y) –g x )/g))+









                                                      Print["Begin:"];
For [w1=0,w1<=1,w1=w1+0.1,
               Print[w1];
For [Coeff=3,Coeff<=15,Coeff=Coeff+1,
For [g=2,g<=4,g=g+0.2,





   Y1=Random[Real,{Ymin,Ymax}];

















                                                                                                                                                                            
Print["Function Uxy is not
quasiconcave in Iteration number",Nriter,
"Uaver,U1,U2=",Uaver,  U1,   U2];
  Goto [theend];
,];







                               /////////////////////////OUTPUT///////////////////////////////
Begin:
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.
the END1
The END
